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ACADEMIC FREEDOM AND FACULTY CAREERS:
A CASE STUDY OF
FOUR NOBEL LAUREATE EXILES
1930-1940
ABSTRACT
The purpose of this historical study was to evaluate
the consequences that the politically-determined
conventions of academic freedom in Germany and in the
United States had on the careers of four elite scientists
before and after their emigration resulting from the
threats of Nazism.

This problem consisted of three

distinct conceptual parts:
concept,

(l) academic freedom, as a

(2) the political conventions of academic

freedom within pre-World War II Germany and within preand World War II America, and (3) the effect that these
definitions had on the careers of Albert Einstein, James
Franck, Otto Meyerhof, and Otto Stern.

The methodology

that best suited this evaluation was the historical case
study.
In Germany, I followed academic freedom's evolution
beginning with Humboldt's work at the University of
Berlin, continuing through to the Weimar Republic, and
vi

concluding with the National Socialists.

In the United

States, I traced academic freedom's development from its
classically-based roots, moving through the entrance of
the German model, and closing wit h the impact of the
American Association of University Professors.
Incumbent in this discussion was the effects that
German nationalism, National Socialism, the Great
Depression,

communism, and anti-semitism had upon the

evolution of academic freedom.

I concluded that the

nature and development of academic freedom was formed and
directed b y the constructs of and the constraints upon
intellectual liberty.

Its politically-determined

conventions influenced, both positively and negatively,
the careers of four particular scientists.
More in-depth study is necessary to further evaluate
the relationship between various governing bodies and the
academic freedom of the Jewish professoriate.
Additionally,

insight into the degree and manner of

influence of university presidents upon the careers of
faculty is also needed.

TIMOTHY DALE NORTON
SCHOOL OF EDUCATION
THE COLLEGE OF WILLIAM AN D MARY IN VIRGINIA
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ACADEMIC FREEDOM AND FACULTY CAREERS
A CASE STUDY OF
FOUR NOBEL LAUREATE EXILES
1930-1940

CHAPTER 1
ACADEMIC FREEDOM AND THE CAREERS OF FOUR INTELLECTUALS

Introduction
It takes but one look at the inscription on the
Statue of Liberty to be reminded that America has always
been a place of refuge for those "tired...poor"
individuals who,

in their attempts to escape intolerance

and oppression in foreign lands, found in this nation a
place where they could finally "breath free."

Scattered

among the "huddled masses" fleeing Hitler's strangle-hold
were intellectuals looking for opportunities to continue
to pursue their careers in the country that had so
willingly opened its "golden door" to them.

This study

evaluates the influence that academic freedom in Germany
and the United States had on the careers of four such
intellectuals both before and after their emigration from
the threats of Nazism.

Understanding Academic Freedom
In order for an institution of higher learning to
legitimately state that academic freedom exists within
its boundaries,

the professors of that institution must
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be able to say that they can "pursue the truth
unhindered"

(Pincoffs 1975, v i i i ) .

definition is brief,

Although this

it focuses upon the core issue of an

educational concept that can be adulterated by the most
innocent of attempts to clarify its various conventions.
Within the context of this inquiry,

"pursuit" is

defined as "the act of following with a view to reach,
accomplish or obtain"

(Webster,

1828).

The professor who

claims to be functioning in a free academic environment
is intimating that he or she is involved in a process
that has an attainable goal.

The precise intention and

ultimate expectation is the "attainment" of the goal,
truth, that is being pursued (Searle, 1975; Metzger,
1977).
Truth, which is defined as "conformity to fact or
reality"

(Webster, 1828), is an objective for which the

scholar labors tirelessly.

Attempts, however valiant and

well-intentioned, to articulate its parameters inevitably
result in an acknowledgement that there are numerous
dissimilar perceptions about as well as countless
disparate approaches to its elusive essence
1975; Metzger,

(Pincoffs,

1977).

Finally, this "pursuit of truth" must occur in an
"unhindered" environment, that is, one "without
opposition"

(Webster, 1828).

Pincoffs

(1975) offers two

4
perspectives that are helpful in determining the precise
nature of a hindrance to teaching or to learning.
is the hindrance an "innocent" one?

First,

In other words, does

it arise in the form of a natural event such as a
thunderstorm or hurricane that causes an interruption in
a power supply?

Or second, does the hindrance betray

deliberate intentions to obstruct particular activities,
as would an administrative decision to withdraw research
funds from a project that is considered "professionally
desirable?"
The effects of academic freedom in a system of
higher education are of fundamental importance to this
study.

Does the presence of academic freedom in a

college or university influence the careers of that
institution's professors?

Academic Freedom in a World Gone Mad
During the 1800s and early 1900s, German
universities were generally accepted as having evolved
into the premier institutions of higher learning in
Europe.

Foreign students who were studying at

universities in Berlin, Heidelberg and Leipzig during
this time filled educational journals with articles that
praised the scholarly life that they were experiencing
(Hofstadter and Smith, 1961).

After the end of the
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American Civil War, students in the United States
experienced limited opportunities for scientific research
or for serious contemplation of studies due to the lack
of scholarship in American colleges.

Opportunities paled

in light of what they read about educational institutions
in Germany (Rudolph, 1962).
By the late 1890s, however, some American students
who had decided to study abroad began to show signs of
disenchantment with German universities.

These scholars

were slowly gaining enough confidence to evaluate the
German model of higher education with a more
discriminating eye--accepting those aspects, such as the
research ideal, which they liked, and moving away from
those, such as an extreme emphasis on certain subjects,
which they did not like

(Veysey, 1965).

On November 11, 1918, with the loss of World W ar I,
Germany became a republic under the stipulations of the
Treaty of Versailles.

Most German professors bitterly

rejected both the Treaty and the newly formed Weimar
Republic.

Since they were convinced that the Republic

had been forced upon the people by the Allies and that
such democratic forms of government were "un-German,"
these professors used their lectures an d writings to
present dangerous nationalistic themes,

such as the

build-up of German armed forces to protect the hon o r of
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the Fatherland,

in spite of such moves being in direct

violation of the stipulations of the Treaty of Versailles
(Kelly, 1972).

They "fell out" of society as a result of

their embitterment against the elite class that they felt
was embodied in the Weimar Republic

(Ringer, 1948).

Additionally, they were also distressed by the
decline of their lecture fees. These fees made up
approximately half of their income and were now being
paid in highly inflated currency.

A loss in social

prestige accompanied the professors'

financially

deteriorating status, as personal wealth had been an
effective facilitator to their social aspirations
1972).

(Kelly,

It was such views that fueled the fires of

dissent throughout the nation and made the even more
extreme nationalism of zealous National Socialists
(Nazis) appear comparatively moderate

(Kneller, 1941).

When the Nazi candidate Adolph Hitler took office as
Chancellor in 1933, the professoriate regarded him as a
temporary presence to be endured until his promises to
ameliorate the injustices of the Treaty of Versailles
could be implemented (Kneller, 1941; Lilge,
Beyerchen,

1977).

1975;

Since the academic community had

chosen to tolerate Hitler's presence, his National
Socialist Party met with no substantive opposition when
they moved to control the Weimar universities.

The
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Nazis' initial efforts were directed toward a
modification of the tenets of academic freedom so as to
facilitate the attainment of their ultimate political
goal of transforming the

professoriate into an

of unquestioning support

for the State (1941) .

instrument

Up to this point in time, professors had always
insisted that freedom of research and impartiality in
learning--the basic constructs of the German model of
academic freedom--be maintained in order to preserve the
integrity of the university.

However, members of

university faculties quietly stood by as Hitler altered
these revered ideals.

Professors raised few objections

when he insinuated that their personal research projects
were, in actuality, occasions for the development of
ideas in opposition to the fundamental aims of National
Socialism (Kneller, 1941; Beyerchen,
Hitler expected the

1977).

professoriate to acknowledge the

inherent superiority of the Aryan race

and the

innate

inferiority of anyone not aligned w ith the pure Germanic
ideal

(Kneller, 1941).

The outcome of any deviation by a

professor from these and other Nazi dictates was
expulsion from his or her teaching position; indeed, over
2,000 persons--almost 25% of the faculty that had been
employed in German universities during the academic year
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of 1931-32--literally disappeared by the end of the
winter semester of 1933-34

(Hartshorn, 1937).

Beginning in the 1930s, therefore, numerous members
of German academia left their homeland in search of
personal safety and professional opportunity in the
United States.

In fact, the number of intellectuals

emigrating from continental Europe increased each year
between 1930 and the early 1940s

(Fermi, 1968).

The

magnitude of this Intellectual Diaspora was "so large and
of such high [intellectual] quality that it constituted a
new phenomenon in the history of immigration"

(1968, 11).

Within this throng of highly educated immigrants
there existed a subgroup of elite German scientists,
including Albert Einstein (1879-1955), James Franck
(1882-1964), Otto Meyerhof

(1884-1951), and Otto Stern

(1888-1969), who came to the United States.

These four

individuals, all of whom had either won the Nobel Prize
in their chosen field or would soon move into laureate
status,

joined faculties of American institutions of

higher education and renounced their allegiance to the
Fatherland to become naturalized citizens of their
adopted homeland.
W h y did these men choose to leave Germany and come
to the United States?

To what degree was Hitler's effort
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to control the universities academic freedom related to
their emigration?
After their arrival in the United States, these men
had to adjust to a new system of higher education and to
reestablish successful academic and research careers
(Zuckerman, 1977; Geiger, 1986; Haffner, 1991).

The

model of academic freedom that Einstein, Franck,
Meyerhof, and Stern found in American universities had
originally been influenced by the German concept of
Lehrfreiheit

{the freedom to teach); however, American

scholars had extended the German parameters of academic
freedom to also include freedom of speech and expression
outside the educational institution (Hofstadter and
Metzger,

1955;

Poch, 1993).

American professors

believed that the freedom of expression guaranteed to
every citizen was sufficient foundation for their claim
to "extra-mural utterance."

This claim was substantiated

in the American Association of University Professors'
1915 General Declaration of Principles
Smith,

(Hofstadter and

1961).

In the years following the presentation of this
declaration, questions about the application of the
concept of "extra-mural utterance" surfaced.

In pre-

World War II America there was concern over the political
ideologies of communism,

fascism, and National Socialism
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emerging from the European continent.

Consequently,

in

an effort to discourage "un-American" opinions, a number
of the forty-eight states enacted teacher-oath statutes
(Brubacher and Rudy, 1958) .

This legislation, which

required a vocal support of state and federal
constitutions, was considered b y members of the
professoriate as a limitation to their right to "extra
mural" utterance.

The oaths were not dissimilar in many

respects to some of the nationalistic requirements of the
Third Reich (1958) .

Academic freedom in both Germany and

the United States was being restricted by political
forces.
What then were the similarities and dissimilarities
between the condition of academic freedom in Germany at
the time of Einstein, Franck, Meyerhof, and Stern's
departure and that of academic freedom in America upon
their arrival?

The Research Problem
The problem of this historical study is to evaluate
the consequences that the politically-determined
conventions of academic freedom in Germany and in the
United States had on the careers of four elite scientists
before and after their emigration resulting from the
threats of Nazism.

This problem consists of three
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distinct conceptual parts:
concept,

(1) academic freedom, as a

(2) the political conventions of academic

freedom within pre-World War I- Germany and within preand World War II America, and (3) the effect that these
definitions had on the careers of four elite scientists.
In order to solve the research problem, four
research questions are posed.

The first deals with the

theory of academic freedom:
1. What forces impacted upon the evolution of the
concept of academic freedom in Germany from 18001938 and in America from 1700-1940?
The next two questions take the concept of academic
freedom and place it into the context of pre-World War II
Germany and of pre-and World War II America:
2. What were the politically-determined conventions
of academic freedom within pre-World War II Germany?
a. How was academic freedom manifested within
and influenced by the Weimar Republic?
b. How did Hitler's efforts to control the
German university affect academic freedom?
3. What were the politically-determined conventions
of academic freedom within pre-and World W ar II
America?
a. How did "wartime" influence academic
freedom in America?
b. How was the right to intra-and extra-mural
utterance preserved by the actions of the AAUP?
The fourth question addresses the effect that the German
and American models of academic freedom had on the
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careers of these four elite scientists;

Einstein,

Franck, Meyerhof, and Stern:
4. What elements of the political conventions of
academic freedom effected the careers of these
scientists before they left Germany and after they
arrived in America?
a.
What were the similarities and distinctions
between the condition of academic freedom in
Germany at the time of their departure and that
of academic freedom in America upon their
arrival?
b.
Did American academic freedom permit
these scientists a different arena for research
and teaching than that which had existed in
pre-World War II totalitarian Germany?

The Concept of Academic Freedom
Searle

(1975) argues that at the heart of any theory

of academic freedom is the contention "that professors
should have the right to teach, conduct research, and
publish their research without interference..."

(87).

He

argues that the justification for these prerogatives
derives from the fundamental objective of the university
of advancing and disseminating knowledge.

In other

words, in order for a professor to "pursue the truth
unhindered"

(Pincoffs, 1975) and for the outcome of that

inquiry to be transmitted to others, an environment free
from academic restraints must be in place (Searle, 1975).
Fuchs

(1963) and Lovejoy (1930) also attach great

importance to professors' being allowed to function
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without hindrance from political, ecclesiastical, or
administrative authority.

Fuchs emphasizes that academic

freedom "has been expanded in the United States
to...protect the liberty to participate in extra-mural as
well as intra-mural activities"

(1963, 444).

Lovejoy

presents only one exception to the prohibition against
interference with this liberty.

In his definition of

academic freedom, he argues that the sole occasion when a
teacher or research worker may be challenged is if "his
methods are found b y qualified bodies of his own
profession to be clearly incompetent or contrary to
professional ethics"

(1930, 384) .

My study compares and contrasts the manifestation of
academic freedom in institutions of higher education both
in Germany and in the United States during the 1930s and
the early 1940s. I show how the political climate of
these time periods influenced academic freedom's
evolution in each national arena and in turn how its
conventions then influenced the academic careers of the
four emigrant nobel laureate scientists.

Academic Freedom in Germany
In defining academic freedom within pre-World War II
Germany,

I explain the concept's evolution beginning with

Humboldt's work at the University of Berlin,

continuing
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through to the Weimar Republic and concluding with the
National Socialists in the 1930s.

From this point, I

ascertain the influence that academic freedom's
politically-determined conventions had upon the careers
of Einstein, Franck, Meyerhof and Stern before their
emigration from the threats of Nazism.

Academic Freedom in America
An analysis of academic freedom in America
demonstrates the concept's evolution from the 1700s to
the early 1940s and the influence that its politicallydetermined conventions had upon the careers of Einstein,
Franck, Meyerhof and Stern after their emigration from
the threats of Nazism and their arrival in the United
States.

It includes a presentation of the American

paradigm of academic freedom as it evolved over the 25
years following its elucidation in the AAUP's 1915
General Declaration of Principles.

It was during this

period that all of these scientists arrived in this
country and began the process of assimilation into its
culture and its system of higher education.

The Purpose of the Study
The justification for my study is found in two
areas.

First, my analysis compares the influence that
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the different politically-determined conventions of
academic freedom had upon the careers of four elite
scientists.

Although numerous studies have focused on

how and to what extent academic freedom has existed on
college campuses
Gay,

(Alberty and Bode,

1968; McClelland,

1938; Rudolph, 1962;

1980) and several researchers have

described the influence that political realities in
American and Germany during the 1930s and early 1940s had
upon academic freedom (Burlingham, Byrne, Seabury and
Stimson, 1936; Hartshorne,
1977; Zuckerman,

1937; Davie, 1947; Beyerchen,

1977), no inquiries have emphasized an

evaluation of the influence that the politicallydetermined conventions of academic freedom had upon the
careers of the scientists in this study.
Second,

I address the limits which can be placed

upon academic freedom when its principles are not
safeguarded.

The National Socialists'

rise to power made

it possible for them to implement their educational
philosophy, which radically altered the exercise of
academic freedom in German universities
1937; Kneller,

1941; Gallin, 1986).

(Hartshorne,

Likewise,

the

ethnocentrism and nationalism in the United States during
the 1930s and early 1940s were manifested in the
imposition of teacher oath laws and other limitations to
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freedom of thought, speech, and teaching (Capen, 1937;
Carlson and Lovejoy, 1937; Duggan,

1937; Tyler, 1937).

Research into the influence that different
politically-determined conventions of academic freedom
had upon the careers of four elite scientists and into
the limits which can be placed upon academic freedom when
its principles are not safeguarded is important because
it illustrates that limitations to academic freedom can
be manifested in either a socialistic dictatorship or a
democratic republic.

It reinforces the necessity of

constant vigilance as the inevitable price of freedom.

Delimitations and Limitations
Academic freedom is an educational practice whose
roots go back to Socrates, Plato and Aristotle.

It has

been an issue of concern and debate as long as there have
been teachers who taught the truth (Lovejoy, 1930; Fuchs,
1963).

When addressing an educational concept with such

an extensive and wide-ranging heritage, limitations must
be set as to the time frame within which it will be
analyzed.

For this reason, I established the 1930s as

the central time period for my study.
I have limited this study to the careers of four
particular German scientists who served on faculties of
German institutions of higher education during pre-World
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War II Germany because scholars from this time period
would have experienced the shift from Weimar isolation to
Nazi control.

Further, I selected immigrant professors

who became naturalized citizens of the United States
after their emigration from Germany and who joined
faculties of American institutions of higher education.
The reason for this being that an evaluation of the
influence of academic freedom upon their careers would
provide supportive documentation for the comparative
study of academic freedom and its influence on
professorial careers.

Finally,

I chose Nobel laureates

primarily because the personal notoriety generated by the
receipt of a Nobel Prize should insure the availability
of sufficient documentation for an accurate evaluation of
various aspects of their careers.
This study is limited by the available research
sources of records, personal diaries, published writings
of the period and other documents.
with historical studies

As is often the case

(including this one ) , the option

of gathering primary data from personal interviews is
eliminated as the individuals under study are deceased.
Also,

it is unfortunate that considerably less

documentation is available on the career of Otto Stern
than on those of Albert Einstein, James Franck, and Otto
Meyerhof.

No additional information on Stern was found
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after

(1) speaking with Dr. Prank Mecklingburg of Ne w

York's Leo Baeck Institute, which is a library dedicated
to the collection of volumes that contain information
about German-speaking Jews from central Europe;

(2)

contacting Mr. Kenneth Schoen, who is a specialist in
scholarly out-of-print and used Judaica texts on exiles;
and

(3) talking to the research librarian of the Research

Institute of the United States Holocaust Memorial Museum
in Washington, D. C.

The paucity of material available

on this one scholar limited the evaluation of his career.

CHAPTER 2
REVIEW OF THE LITERATURE

Introduction
"...[T]he interaction between the university's own
built-in conservatism and the pressures upon it to adapt
to new external conditions is one of the most potentially
illuminating...aspects of the process of historical
change"

{Stone, 1974, vol. I, v ) .

Looking at the

interactive nature of the relationship between the
university and its environment, academic freedom is one
particular dynamic of that relationship whose parameters
have often been the subject of heated debate during those
occasions when institution and society conflict.

The

development and influence of this somewhat abrasive
catalyst during certain historical periods serve as the
underlying themes of this review of related literature.

The Concept of Academic Freedom
Academic freedom is viewed as the prerogative of
scholars "to be left free from interference or punishment
to teach and to publish what they sincerely believe to be
true"

(Jones, 1975, 38).

The conviction of academics, as

19
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with Socrates when he chose hemlock rather than
capitulation to state demands to alter his teachings, has
been that they be allowed to present their studied view
of truth with the intention of equipping their students
with the capacity, as Max Weber argued,
clearly11 (Shils, 1973, 37) .

"to think

As a result of the tension

occasionally created by this conviction, the issue of
academic freedom has been for centuries the subject of
debate.

In order to gain a full-orbed understanding of

this fundamental concept, an appropriate starting point,
as the roots of the concept of the modern university can
be traced there, is the Middle Ages

(Franklin, 1981;

Pulliam, 1987).
Ushered in by the death of the last Carolingian
Emperor in 877, the Middle Ages were replete with
barbarian attacks upon western Europe from the North.

As

a result of the terror and disruption these invasions
caused, medieval populations chose to rally around local
strongmen,

thereby becoming dependent upon them for their

lives and their livelihood (Franklin, 1981; Kagan,
Ozment, and Turner,

1983) .

Fear of annihilation was a

component of the fidelity that the common people showed
to their feudal masters and of the contempt that they had
for foreigners.

This aversion to foreigners initially

led to the formation of scholastic guilds, universitas.
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which were designed for the protection and support of
foreign students.

Although guilds had no campus an d no

administrative structure,

they permitted the medieval

professor to teach truth.

However, the Middle Ages'

concept of truth required faculty to expound upon that
which had already been revealed b y a higher
ecclesiastical or political authority, not to search
freely for something that was as yet undiscovered
(Thelin, 1982, Haskins,

1984).

This early model of

intellectual liberty was a precursor of its modern
counterpart,

academic freedom.

The constant fear of impending devastation by
invading barbarians that was a reality of life in the
Middle Ages was replaced by the comparative security of
the Renaissance.

Historians generally mark the beginning

of the Renaissance with the fall of Constantinople to the
Ottoman Turks in 1453, a n event that resulted in scholars
of the Byzantine Empire fleeing to western Europe for
safety (Thompson and Hicks,

1985).

When these academics

arrived, they found the ties between academic activity
and strict ecclesiastical authority and influence
loosening as a result of the doubts that were developing
in the freer atmosphere of the Renaissance
1981).

(Franklin,
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Additionally, a new heightened regard for
individuality also contributed to the reappraisal of
authority structures in general.

The philosophical basis

for the Renaissance's increased emphasis upon the dignity
of man and his individualism, commonly labeled Humanism,
served to move scholars to promote an increased awareness
of the need for political and civic liberty {Kagan et
a l . , 1983).
Humanism provided scholars with a theoretical
perspective that influenced the scope, or development, of
intellectual freedom.

Academics began to draw their own

conclusions about the Classics, not necessarily mimicking
the views of previously recognized scholastic
authorities.

This heady atmosphere fostered a

considerably freer academic environment for intellectual
pursuits than had ever existed during the Middle Ages
(Fuchs, 1963; Fleming,

1980; Haskins,

1984).

The questioning of authority that was a hallmark of
the Renaissance prepared the way for the Protestant
Reformation in Germany; with the precipitous event in
1517 being Martin Luther's presentation of his "95
Theses," which contained direct challenges to papal
practices

(Fleming, 1980; Kagan et al., 1983).

Academic

institutions were influenced by scholars fresh with
excitement over the liberty they anticipated developing
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as a result of the ever-increasing interest in humanistic
philosophy.

The professoriate soon realized, however,

that liberty was much easier to contemplate than to
apply.

Instead of finding encouragement and support from

their ecclesiastical superiors, professors came face-toface with opposition from church leaders who felt
threatened by the increasing intellectual liberty being
enjoyed by academics

(Pincoffs, 1975; Fleming, 1980).

In the early 1500s, noteworthy scholar Johann Wessel
of Gansfort, who taught Greek and Hebrew at Heidelberg,
had his writings characterized b y university officials as
inappropriate for dissemination to students.

The

influential ecclesiastical hierarchy labeled Wessel's
ideas as being disintegrative of their allegiance to the
Pope

(Thomas and Hicks, 1985).

It is noteworthy that the

professoriate and the university,

two entities that by

design must work in close proximity with one another and
that have similar theoretical foundations--the discovery
and propagation of truth--surface at cross purposes when
each is faced with pressure from the fluctuating
political and social agendas around them (Veysey, 1965;
Pincoffs, 1975).
Over the next 200 years, with the decline of the
influence of the ecclesiastical system over the academic
arena,

scientists-scholars like Galileo and Newton, were
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revered with an almost God-like status as they were
individuals capable of solving the mysteries of the
universe and displaying their results with mathematical
precision.

In like manner, political philosophers such

as Locke offered solutions to the excesses of
governmental authority by presenting all men as being
"equal and independent"

{Kagan et al., 1983, 526).

The

concept of individual freedom of thought that was
developed out of this egalitarian philosophy allowed
professors to begin to extend the limits of intellectual
activity beyond the borders set for them by previous
thinkers (1983).

The German Model of Academic Freedom
One extension of this intellectual activity that
surfaced at the beginning of the 1800s was the German
educational reform posed by Wilhelm von Humboldt. As head
of the educational bureaucracy in Germany, he was
determined to support university reform and greatly
influenced changes at the University of Berlin.

Berlin's

founding in 1810 marked the beginning of the modern
period of German university development.

Humboldt's

efforts were primarily directed at removing the influence
of the Germanic princes and in establishing the
university as a "privileged corporation with self-
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governing rights.1' (Samuel and Thomas,

1971, 113).

By

endowing universities with self-governing corporate
status, Humboldt's intent was to remove them from the
whims of political influence and censorship that were
inherent in their state as "royal" institutions
(Beyerchen,

1977).

Humboldt imbued the concept of academic freedom with
two fundamental principles that influenced subsequent
models.

The first principle, Lehrfreiheit. was the

freedom of teaching.

He argued that the professor should

be free from restraint to follow his convictions while
teaching, and should be free to select his lecture
subjects and to not follow a government-prescribed
syllabus.

Humboldt's second principle,

Lernfreiheit. was

the freedom of study; the student was free to attend
whatever lectures he wished and could constantly shift
from one university to another during his academic career
(Samuel and Thomas, 1971) .

Such concepts were embraced

by some of the faculty and slowly began to develop in the
fertile environment that such liberty provided.

However,

these ideas of German educational reform were ultimately
destined to be implemented only as far as the state's
educational officials allowed (Thompson and Hicks,

1985).

By the latter 1800s, the several German
principalities had been molded into one unified state
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through the diplomatic efforts of Prussian Chancellor,
Otto von Bismarck (Franklin, 1981; Thompson and Hicks,
1985) .

This new government's centralized educational

ministry became the one primary source for university
funding.

From this vantage point, members of the state

educational ministry could pick and choose those concepts
that they would allow members of the professoriate to
propagate

(Ringer, 1969; Kelly, 1972).

This strong

governmental presence in academic circles continued
through the end of World War X in 1918, when Germany
became a republic (Franklin, 1981).
Universities in the Weimar Republic, where according
to writers such as Abraham Flexner

(1932) academic

freedom was alive and well, were in actuality fraught
with religious and political discrimination.

The

situation was so desperate that M a x Weber, a prominent
German scholar and social scientist, upon hearing that a
friend's political and religious views made it impossible
for him to secure a teaching position in Germany, stated
in an open letter that he was "unable to behave as if we
possessed a freedom of teaching which somebody could
still take away from us"

(Ringer, 1969, 143).

This case was typical of other situations where
blatant acts of discrimination resulted in the
development of a mutant version of Humbolt's original
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model of academic freedom, which allowed for a diversity
of opinion within the university faculty (Gallin, 1986).
" [German universities] were

[becoming]...nurseries of a

woolly-minded militarist idealism and centers of
resistance to the new in art or the social sciences;
Jews, democrats, socialists, in a word outsiders, were
kept from the sacred precincts of higher learning"

(Gay,

1968, 3).
Largely due to the Weimar Republic's support of the
Treaty of Versailles,

conservative professors gradually

became disillusioned with the government.

These

professors believed that the Treaty's stipulations that
Germany pay reparations to the Allies was unacceptable
and "un-German."

They also felt that such policies were

taking Germany into a period of economic decline.
Government funds were going to pay the war reparations
stipulated at Versailles;

therefore,

there was less money

available to pay state employees such as professors
(Kandel, 1935; Kelly, 1972).
After little more than thirteen years in power, the
Weimar Republic began to loose control of the political
sphere.

By the time of the national elections in 1932,

the German economy was near collapse.

To meet the

increased demands for state money to pay war debts, the
government printed more and more "marks."

The
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uncontrolled inflation that resulted left the mark
practically valueless and over six million workers
unemployed.

These circumstances, coupled with a

nationalistic resentment over the impact of Germany
having lost World War I, led to the National Socialist
(Nazi) Party gaining control of the Reichstag and Hitler
being appointed by President Hindenburg as Chancellor of
Germany

(Hoover,

1933; Rodes, 1964; Franklin, 1981).

The Nazi Party immediately focused their efforts
toward controlling the educational system.
"The.. . [influence of the] National Socialist regime

[was]

devoted to two main tasks, first to destroy all vestiges
of the contributions to education made during the
Republican period, and, second, to build up a new
philosophy of education based on the doctrines of the
Revolution"

(Kandel, 1935, 33).

The Nazis saw

institutions of higher learning as potential instruments
for the advancement of their political agenda.

Because

the National Socialist Party felt that some professors
had sacrificed the common national interest to their own
narrow concerns,

the Nazis had to "save the universities

and found them on the soil of the national
idea...to give

(volkish)

[them] body and soul, and to hasten

[their] development in the light of racial theory"
53) .

(1935,
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The Nazis' adjustments to the German model of
academic freedom were based upon their determination to
alter the concepts of freedom of teaching and research to
meet the needs of the totalitarian state.

To ensure

loyalty, Hitler decided that promotion within the ranks
of the university faculty was to be determined, not b y
peers, but by Nazi state officials who would make
candidates swear to teach and conduct research solely in
the interest of the state.

Policies such as this brought

about the dismantling of Humboldt's German model of
academic freedom {Kandel, 1935; Ringer,

1969; Gallin,

1986).

The American Model of Academic Freedom
Much of the struggle for academic freedom in America
centered around the idea that intellectual liberty
included freedom of thought, speech, and writing.
Although professors generally considered intellectual
liberty to be their right, there were some ecclesiastical
and political authorities who considered it to be a
privilege over which they alone had authority.

This

conflict between a professor's v i e w of his rights and a
collegiate governing board's vie w as to their
jurisdiction began to surface after the American
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Revolutionary War

(Hofstadter and Metzger,

1955; Cohen,

1968).
As citizens in a new and independent nation,
Americans were eager to move into the period of discovery
and expansion that lay ahead of them (Cohen, 1986) .

The

classically-based curriculum of the colonial college did
not equip its graduates to function successfully within
this emerging frontier society

(Lowman, 1983).

Instead,

the call was for institutions of higher education with
utility-centered curricula that would academically outfit
the graduate to face the needs of this new nation
(Portman, 1972; 1983) .

Such reform in the content of

collegiate course work and in curriculum design required
educators to move into higher levels of scholarship and
research.

This provided an opportunity for professors so

equipped to become more involved in the decision-making
processes of their colleges

(French, 1964; 1972; Herbst,

1982).
As the curriculum was expanded, more funds were
needed to support the innovative programs being offered.
This put college boards and administrators in need of
increased amounts of state monies and consequently moved
them closer to the political realm.

University boards,

whose political views were generally similar to those of
their governmental benefactors,

did not want their
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faculty members to express views that conflicted with the
political status quo.
was slavery.

One particularly explosive issue

Depending upon the political climate of the

area, being in support of or in opposition to this issue
could either cost a university its funding or a professor
his position (Brubacher and Rudy, 1958; French, 1964;
Portman, 1972).
As colleges were attempting to expand their
programs, progress was not always being made quickly
enough for young scholars.

When these men looked at the

universities in Germany, they saw institutions that were
offering a higher level of learning than they could find
at home.

Consequently, many of these students chose to

continue their studies abroad in universities at Berlin
and Gottingen.

While in Germany, they had the

opportunity to see the concepts of Lehrfreiheit. freedom
of teaching, and Lernfreiheit. freedom of learning,
establishing an environment of free intellectual activity
that they wanted to transfer to their academic
institutions in America (Thwing, 1928; Flexner,
Hofstadter and Metzger, 1955; Veysey,

1932;

1965).

Upon returning home, these scholars extended the
German model of academic freedom to include the right to
extra-mural utterance, the freedom to address issues of
their choice beyond the campus of their college or
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university.

Professors believed that their

constitutional guarantee to freedom of speech served as
the foundation for their claim.

It was this professorial

contention that led to confrontations with university
boards and financial supporters when they did not agree
with a professor's position (Thwing, 1928; Veysey,
Portman,

1965;

1972).

By the early 1900s, professors who were exercising
their right to extra-mural utterance were concerned that
they did not have an arena to which they could appeal
when they felt their rights were being infringed.

It was

out of this concern and frustration that college
professors founded the American Association of University
Professors

(AAUP) in 1915 as an organization dedicated to

the protection of the principles of academic freedom
{Hofstadter and Metzger, 1955; Brubacher and Rudy,
Pulliam,

1958;

1987).

Over the next 25 years, the AAUP issued five major
statements which charted the course for the development
of academic freedom in America.

The first such document

was the 1915 Declaration of Principles, which set forth
the right of professors to pursue the truth unhindered as
well as the right to intra- and extra-mural utterance
(Alberty and Bode, 1938; Joughin, 1969; Hendersen and
Hendersen,

1975; Karier, 1986).

The second document was
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the Report of the Committee on Academic Freedom in
Wartime, which was presented in 1918.

This Report stated

that restrains could be placed upon the academic freedom
of professors during a time of war; but,

that these

limitations could not go beyond those expected of the
average citizen (Report, 1918; Bearde an d Bearde,
Bentwich,

1930;

1953; Brubacher and Rudy, 1958; Finkelstein,

1984).
The third document was the 1925 Statement on
Academic Freedom.

This report was the product of

collaborative efforts on the part of several national
educational organizations.

One major benefit of this

report to college and university professors was that
various national organizations had worked together on
this project and that they were all available to assist
in investigations of possible infringements upon academic
freedom (Alberty and Bode, 1938; Bentwich,
Hofstadter and Metzger, 1955).

1953;

The fourth document was

the 1937 Statement of Committee B in which the AAUP
responded to the controversy over teacher loyalty oaths,
which required professors to pledge their allegiance to
state and federal constitutions.

The Committee stated

that scholars should be permitted to discuss
controversial issues;

therefore,

they could not tolerate
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limitations upon their academic freedom (Carlson, 1937;
Alberty and Bode, 1938; Knight and Hall, 1951).
The final document was the 1940 Statement of
Principles and Interpretive Comments on Academic Freedom
and Tenure, which became the most widely known and
endorsed statement of its kind in America

(Poch, 1993).

As a product of the joint efforts of the AAUP and the
American Association of Colleges, an organization of
college presidents,

this report restated the principles

of academic freedom in order to ensure that the
constitutionally-guaranteed rights of those who seek to
teach the truth are maintained within a society that has
the right to know the truth (Joughin, 1969; Poch, 1993).

The Careers of Four Elite Scientists
The careers of Albert Einstein, James Franck, Otto
Meyerhof and Otto Stern, thrived during the Weimar
period, suffered during Germany's transition to National
Socialism, and culminated in institutions of higher
education in America (Weber, 1980; Magill,

1989).

Each

of these men won a Nobel Prize and was recognized as
being part of the elite international scientific
community of the first half of the Twentieth Century
(Heathcote,

1953; Estermann, 1959; Zukerman,

1977).

adds additional interest to their already illustrious

What
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careers are the times in which they lived and the choices
they made in response to the influence of those times
upon the institutions of higher education in which they
served (Bentwich, 1953; Fermi, 1968; Beyerchen,

1977),

Germany had lost the "War To End All Wars"
(Franklin, 1981,

198) and her destiny was now in the

hands of its victors, all of whom wanted her to p a y
dearly for the over 40 million lives that had been
claimed by the conflict.
signed in 1919,

The Treaty of Versailles,

stipulated that Germany relinquish one-

seventh of her land, all of her overseas territories, and
pay reparations.
requirements,

Largely as a result of these

the country was bankrupt, both financially

and emotionally; resentment had begun to build against
those countries that the German people felt were exacting
their "pound of flesh" from a nation that had nothing
left to give

(Hoover, 1933; Kelly, 1972; Fleming,

1980;

Franklin, 1981).
It was during these turbulent times just after World
War I that Einstein, Franck, Meyerhof,

and Stern were

researching, experimenting and teaching in German
universities.

Each man had been recognized and lauded

for efforts in his field.

Einstein, whose "General

Theory of Relativity" had been published in 1915, and
whose Nobel Prize in Physics in 1921 h a d firmly ensconced
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him as an international celebrity, was serving as a
professor of physics at the University of Berlin.

A

recipient of the 1925 Nobel Prize in Physics, Franck had
accepted the position of Director of the Zweite
Physikalische Institut in 1920

(Weber,

1980; Magill,

1989; Fox, Meldrum, and Rezak, 1990).
While serving at the Department of Physiology at the
University of Kiel, Meyerhof had won the Nobel Prize for
Medicine and Physiology in 1922.

He later moved to the

Kaiser Wilhelm Institute for Medical Research in
Heidelberg and was working there as the head of the
Department of Physiology in 1929.

Stern, who was deeply

involved in his molecular-beam research, was serving as
Director of the laboratory at the University of Hamberg
(Beyerchen, 1977; Jackman and Borden,

1983, MacPherson,

1986).
All of these scientists were involved in research
projects at highly respected Weimar universities.
Although academic freedom in such institutions was
occasionally marred by discrimination against Jews,

these

four elite, Jewish scientists enjoyed considerable
respect in scholastic circles, due to their significant
scientific and intellectual achievements
Farber, 1953) .

(Davie, 1947;
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After Hitler became Germany's Chancellor on January
30, 1933, the atmosphere of intellectual freedom within
which the academic careers of these scientists thrived
disintegrated.

Slightly more than two months after

assuming power, Hitler had convinced the Reichstag to
pass the Civil Service Law on April 7, 1933 (Franklin,
1981).

The initial implementation of this law led to

over a thousand scholars--classified as either
"politically unreliable" or "non-Aryan"--being
immediately forced to leave their academic positions
(Fermi, 1968; Beyerchen, 1977; 1981).
On M a y 10, 1933, the works of authors ranging from
Marx to Einstein were flung into bonfires at the
University of Berlin and elsewhere across Germany, all in
the name of "Action Against the Un-German Spirit"
(Jackman and Borden, 1983, 31).

The universities became

the instrument for the dissemination of Nazi policy that
would endorse the National Socialist agenda (Grunberger,
1971; Beyerchen,

1977).

The careers of Einstein, Franck, Meyerhof, and
Stern, which previously had been immune to the effects of
discrimination, suddenly had to endure religious and
political bigotry.

Einstein, who was serving as a

Director of the Kaiser Wilhelm Society in 1933, left
Germany to take a position at the Institute for Advanced
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Study in Princeton.

Franck resigned his professorship at

Gottingen in 1933 and spent over a year in Copenhagen,
Denmark, before accepting a professorial post in 1935 at
Johns Hopkins University in Baltimore
Fermi, 1968; Zuckerman,

(Asimov, 1964;

1977).

Meyerhof remained in Germany until 1938, when he
left to work briefly in Paris, prior to coming to America
in 1940 to accept a position as a professor at the
University of Pennsylvania (Fox et al., 1990).

Stern

left his post at the University of Hamburg in 1933 and
founded a molecular-beam laboratory at the Carnegie
Institute of Technology in Pittsburgh during the same
year (Weber, 1980).
Once established in American universities, they all
became naturalized citizens of the United States.
men had chosen,

These

for the culmination of their careers, an

academic environment that contained some limitations and
prejudices; but, generally provided fertile ground for
continued development of their extraordinary abilities
(Fermi, 1968;

Weber, 1980; Hielbut,

1983; Jackman and

Borden, 1983; Clark, 1984) .

Conclusion
Scholars

have defined the concept of academic

freedom for application to

the university setting as
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early as 1915

(Brubacher and Rudy, 1958; Pincoffs,

1975),

and have exhorted administrators and their professorial
colleagues to safeguard its presence on campuses
(Metzger, 1977; Poch, 1993) throughout the century.

Even

today, the concept continues to be analyzed and
translated for the younger members of the professoriate
(Clark, 1984; Renneberg and Walker, 1994).

The concept

has intrigued faculty throughout the century because at
various times, certain non-faculty groups have sought and
managed to curb professional speech in the name of
various political expediencies.

These attempts to bridle

academic freedom have occurred in various western
countries, including both the United States and Germany.
Although numerous scholars

(Pulliam, 1982; Craig,

1984; Macrakis, 1993) have provided examples of
institutional and governmental policies that restricted
faculty speech, none has made an evaluation of the
consequences that the politically-determined conventions
of academic freedom have had on the careers of professors
before and after their emigration from the threats of
Nazism.

It is the intent of this study to make such an

evaluation.

CHAPTER 3
METHODOLOGY

The methodology that would beat suit an evaluation
of the consequences of the politically-determined
conventions of academic freedom on the careers of great
scientists would be to interview these men in person;
however, as all four of the scientists in this study are
deceased, gathering interview-generated data is an
impossibility.

That being the case, the appropriate

methodology is the historical case study.
Historical research focuses upon the interpretation
and significance of individuals and events.

Strictly

defined, it is "...the process of critical inquiry into
past events to produce an accurate description and
interpretation of those events"

(Wiersma, 1986, 219) ;

therefore, since historical research does not permit
either the control or manipulation of historical
phenomenon,

it is suited to this study (Yin, 1984).

Case study methodology does permit an analysis of
motivations.

Studying the way individuals respond to

external realities, evaluating how they accommodate
themselves to those realities, how they fight to break
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out of them, or even how they attempt to change them--all
adapt well to case study research

(Hakim, 1987).

Employing a methodology that allows the analysis of such
motivations is particularly helpful when analyzing the
decisions made by each of these four scientists as they
distanced themselves from the Nazi regime and emigrated
to the United States.
Fundamental to historical research is a review of
the related literature.

This process establishes a

context for the direction of the research and for
interpreting its results
sources,

(Wiersma, 1986).

Primary

"original or firsthand accounts of the event or

experience"

(wiersma,

1986, 220), and secondary sources,

"accounts that are at least once removed from the event"
(1986, 220), are used to establish an understanding of
the historical period under study (1986).

A

comprehensive evaluation of the consequences of the
politically-determined conventions of academic freedom
upon the careers of four individuals requires the
compilation of considerable research.

The research base

facilitates a deeper understanding of the historical
setting in which these individuals lived as well as a
more fully developed comprehension of the educational
concept involved in the evaluation.
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This historical case study employs an embedded
research design (Yin, 1984).

T h e embedded design

facilitates connecting the research done on the initial
issue of the study--academic freedom--to an evaluation of
the consequences that its politically-determined
conventions had on the careers of four elite scientists
before and after their emigration from the threats of
Nazism.
The reason for the selection of this multiple-case
research strategy is that, as a robust design, it draws
evidence from several different cases instead of from
only one.

The evaluation of eac h of the cases

(the

careers of the four elite scientists) follows
"replication” logic; that is, e a c h of the four careers is
expected to have been influenced by the politicallydetermined conventions of academic freedom thereby
"replicating" or "repeating" the expected outcome

(Yin,

1984) .
Each man's academic career has been selected with
the expectation that it was influenced by the
politically-determined conventions of academic freedom.
"The ability to conduct

[four] ... case studies, arranged

effectively within a multiple-case design,

is analogous

to the ability to conduct [four] ...experiments on related
topics....If all the cases turn out as predicted,

these
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[four]...cases...would provide compelling support for the
initial... [question]11 (Yin, 1984, 53).

In this study,

such "support" is a justification for the question:

Did

the politically-determined conventions of academic
freedom have consequences for the careers of four elite
scientists before and after their emigration from the
threats of Nazism?
This historical research follows the four steps
suggested by Wiersma

(1986).

First, is the

identification of the research problem, which includes
conjectures about characteristics of the situation under
study (1986).

In this case, the research problem is to

evaluate the consequences that the politically-determined
conventions of academic freedom had on the careers of
four elite scientists before and after their emigration
from the threats of Nazism.
Second, is the collection and evaluation of resource
materials.

These procedures involve more than the mere

gathering together of research that is related to the
problem.

Resources must be closely examined so as to

determine from where they came and by whom they were
produced.

This process of "external criticism"

establishes the validity or authenticity of documents.
In addition, resources must be examined in order to
determine their accuracy as well as their meaning.

This
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process of "internal criticism" establishes whether or
not resource materials are trustworthy (Wiersma, 1986) .
Third, is the synthesis of information.

Once

resource materials have been subjected to external and
internal criticism,

they can then be reviewed so as to

determine their value in relationship to each other.
This process facilitates the elimination of secondary
sources that duplicate the material found in primary
sources.

It also is the point in evaluation where

inconsistencies that arise from contradictory reports
must be resolved either through further research or b y an
alteration in the research question

(Wiersma, 1986).

Fourth, is the analysis, interpretation and
formulation of conclusions.

The basis for these three

procedures is a logical evaluation of the information
that has been extracted from the resource material.
Ascertaining which are the essential points of the
information gathered, presenting the meaning of that
information, and making a final determination about that
information in light of the original research question is
the last step in historical research (Wiersma, 1986).

CHAPTER 4
THE EVOLUTION OP THE MODERN MODEL OF ACADEMIC FREEDOM
IN GERMANY
1800-1938

Introduction
The account of the evolution of the modern model of
academic freedom in Germany is a narrative of a struggle
for control of a nation's intellectual freedom.

Moving

through the decades between 1800 and 1938, that struggle
occurred within and between the state's political agenda
and the university's desire to pursue the truth,
unhindered.

The dawn of the modern evolution of this

conflict began with the conquest of numerous German
principalities and duchies by the armies of Napoleon at
the beginning of the nineteenth century.

These conflicts

resulted in intellectuals and political activists from
the smaller German states fleeing to the security of the
largest, and as yet unconquered Germanic kingdom,
Prussia.

There, they believed,

they would still find the

freedom to proclaim the need for a great German national
awakening, a right that they felt had been denied in the
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face of the French occupation of their homelands
1964; Maurois,

1966; Thompson and Hicks,

(Rodes,

1985).

Their hopes for liberty were endangered when
Napoleon conquered Prussia and filled it with his
occupying army; however, the presence of French forces on
Prussian soil incited the Prussian population to
outbursts of nationalism (Rodes, 1964; Maurois, 1966; Van
de Graaff, 1975).

Ernst Moritz Arndt, a German poet,

articulated this doctrine of German national pride in his
book, The Spirit of the T i m e :

uWe live in a beautiful,

large, rich land, a land of glorious memories, undying
deeds, unforgettable service to the world in remote and
recent times.

We are the navel of Europe...we are as

good as the b e s t ...German!
people"

What a name and what a

(1964, 266)1

One manifestation of this nationalistic surge
fostered by the immigrant intellectuals and political
activists was the improvement of institutions of higher
education in Prussia.

Frederick William III, ruler of

Prussia, looked to the state universities to assist him
in "replacing, by intellectual strength, the material
forces

[the state] had lost"

(Rodes, 1964, 271).

He

appointed Baron Karl Wilhelm von Humboldt as chief of the
Department of Worship and Public Instruction and, in
1810, provided him with the funds necessary to establish
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a royal university in Berlin (Samuel and Thomas,
Van de Graaff,

1971;

1975).

Humboldt and Berlin
Frederick wanted the University of Berlin to become
"the center of all intellectual activity in northern,
Protestant Germany"

(Rodes, 1964, 272).

His advisors

counseled him to use the University as a tool for the
political reform and reorientation of Prussia.

Frederick

recognized the tremendous influence that teachers could
exert upon the minds of their students.

He, along with

his advisors, anticipated that state universities would
facilitate Germany's national renewal through ideas and
public opinion (1964; McClelland, 1980).
Humboldt's view of the role of the university in
general and the University of Berlin in particular was
quite different from Frederick's.

He did not see higher

education as an instrument to be used to dispense state
propaganda into the lecture halls and ultimately into the
minds of the students.

On the contrary, he felt that

universities were too closely controlled and directed by
governmental bureaucrats with agendas designed to prepare
intellectuals to serve the state.

He believed that the

university should be free to cultivate the uniqueness of
each individual and prepare him for a lifelong voyage of
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personal development--not be directed to produce human
instruments that would increase the state's power and
prosperity (Rodes, 1984; Maurois,

1966; McClelland,

1980) .
With the intent of lessening the state's control,
Humboldt urged Frederick to accord the University of
Berlin status as a corporation with self-governing
rights, a status that would have meant emancipation from
the whims of political influence and censorship.

His

proposal was vehemently opposed by the Prussian
educational bureaucracy which knew that it inevitably
would loose considerable power under such a system
(Beyerchen, 1977; McClelland, 1980) .
Much of the bureaucracy's control was derived from
its prerogative to select appointees to fill positions in
state institutions like the universities.

Not only did

these career bureaucrats not want to sacrifice their
authority, they also did not want to create a situation
where the universities would be free to propagate ideas
that were contrary to those of the state. They
successfully lobbied the King and, as a result,
Humboldt's proposal was not instituted
Graaff, 1975; McClelland,

(Gay, 1968; Van de

1980).

Additionally, many of the professors, who were
bureaucratic appointees, did not embrace Humboldt's
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ideas, fearing that their positions would be jeopardized.
They felt Humboldt's proposal to institutionalize
safeguards to preserve their intellectual freedom from
state interference was unnecessary

(Gay, 1968; Ringer,

1969); instead, they relied upon the idea that the
"worldly setting in which the search for truth takes
place is not capable of seriously distorting the results
of that search"

(1968, 112).

By assuming that the state

could not distort "pure learning," they believed they
were able to maintain the security of their positions and
the integrity of their intellectual pursuits.
Humboldt's fundamental problem with state control of
the university,

the professoriate, and the students was

based upon its treatment of the citizenry and their
institutions as instruments by which it could increase
its power and prosperity

(Lilge, 1975).

This was a theme

he presented several years earlier in his famous essay on
The Sphere and Duties of Government.

His writings often

resounded with the necessity of maintaining an
individual's freedom in order to preserve an individual's
dignity:
He was pleading for a form of social organization
which would allow complete freedom for the self
activity of the mind,
interests,

for the growth of indigenous

for the expression of genuine tastes and
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beliefs, and for the formation of sincere and
intimate relationships between human beings

(1975,

9) .
This concept, demonstrated in the details of his model of
academic self-government, established the guiding
parameters for the evolution of Germany's modern model of
academic freedom (Beyerchen, 1977).
Humboldt set forth three principles that he
considered necessary for the freedom of the intellect to
be established and the fruits of that freedom to grow.
First was the principle of academic self-government.
According to this idea, faculties, comprised of
professors under the chairmanship of a faculty-elected
Dean, nominated qualified individuals to accept
appointments for professorial positions and extended to
them a certificate giving them the right to teach (venia
legendi).

This concept took the "appointing" power out

of the hands of the state bureaucracy (Rodes, 1964;
Maurois, 1966; Lilge, 1975).
Second was the principle of the "freedom of
teaching"

(Lehrfreiheit), which accorded to professors

the right to teach their own convictions without
hindrance from any other arena and to choose their own
lecture subjects without having to follow a stateprescribed syllabus.

Humboldt was concerned that
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government censorship and curriculum control would seduce
men into a uniformity of opinion that would hamper their
selection of a vocation and ultimately their selfrealization.

He was convinced that only if an individual

were permitted to pursue that vocation, which would
develop within him a love of work for its own sake, would
his mind be cultivated and his character ennobled (Rodes,
1964; Lilge,

1975; McClelland,

1980).

Finally, the principle of the "freedom of study"
(Lernfreiheit), allowed a student to attend lectures of
his choice as well as to migrate in his course work from
university to university.

Humboldt wanted the university

to be a place where responsible self-education could
occur.

For him, the aim of education was the cultivation

of human individuality.

This could only happen in an

atmosphere where the student was free to develop his
personality as he wished, an idea that was in conflict
with the state's desire to dictate the direction and
utility of a student's development
1966; Lilge,

(Rodes, 1964; Maurois,

1975).

The Legitimization of Manipulation
The state wanted to maintain control over the
individual freedom that was basic to the nationalistic
movement of the 1800s.

The Ministry of Education
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repressed student unrest and divergent professorial
political views through funding,

through the appointment

and firing process, and through increased scrutiny of
student activities

(Lilge, 1975).

The government was concerned with the turmoil on
university campuses that was being brought about by
students returning from the Napoleonic Wars with an
increased sense of importance as well as an intense
desire for German nationalism (McClelland, 1980).

At the

University of Berlin the education ministry asked the
Rector to turn over the names of students who had
participated in a meeting that the police had labeled as
"foreboding of revolutionary chaos"

(Lilge, 1975, 22).

In response to the state's reaction to student unrest,
Ernst Moritz Arndt, a member of the faculty of the
University of Bonn, published demands for greater freedom
of expression for students

(Kandel, 1935; 1975) .

Arndt's subsequent arrest by the state for having
protested on behalf of the students brought complaints
from the academic senates of both the Universities of
Berlin and Bonn for what they termed as "arbitrary
interferences with academic freedom"

(Lilge, 1975,

23) .

Although their objections were ignored, a willingness to
confront the bureaucracy was developing among the
professoriate.

The ideology of nationalism was spreading
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to the faculties of state universities

(1975; McClelland,

1980).
In the struggle to maintain their control over
institutions of higher education, one "trump card" that
the state repeatedly used was that of funding.
Universities and their faculties had to depend for their
financial support primarily upon the state.

As a result,

most of the professoriate felt obliged to support a
system upon which they relied for the preservation of
their economic interests
Thomas,

(Kandel, 1935; Samuel and

1971; bilge, 1975).

By the latter part of the 1800s, a situation
developed that was significant in the state's continued
effort to control the affairs of the university.
Professorial academic freedom was once again the issue.
The Prussian Minister of Education, Freidrich Althoff,
was not known as a supporter of the principles of
academic freedom.

He frequently filled vacancies on

university faculties without conferring with other
faculty members and was never hesitant about letting
professors know of the risks they were running if their
views did not align with Imperial policy (Craig, 1978;
Gallin,

1986).

Upon discovering that Leo Arons, a young physics
lecturer at the University of Berlin, was active in the
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Social Democratic party--a political group whose agenda
was in opposition to that of the state, Althoff demanded
that his venia legendi be withdrawn.

The faculty senate

refused to sanction Arons as there was no evidence that
his political inclinations had any negative impact upon
his teaching

(Gallin, 1986; Craig,

1978).

in the face of

this rebuff, Althoff went over their heads and the
Prussian government deprived Arons of his venia lecrendi
by passing a new law stating that "the deliberate
promotion of Social Democratic purposes is incompatible
with a teaching post in a royal university"
Thomas, 1971,

(Samuel and

117).

The passage of "lex Arons" b y the Prussian
government was a direct infringement upon academic
freedom.

It encroached upon the authority of academic

self-governance granted to the university;

the faculty,

not the state, was the body that bestowed the venia
lecrendi upon qualified professors and lecturers and,
thereby had the authority to sanction those who they
determined had acted in an unprofessional manner.

In

spite of the attack upon academic freedom embodied in the
passage of "lex Arons," many of the faculty were
reluctant to go beyond mere criticism for fear that they
would be putting their own careers in peril
1969; Samuel and Thomas,

1971; Craig,

1978).

(Ringer,
in contrast
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to this stance were the challenges brought to this arena
by world renowned sociologist and scholar Max Weber.
Weber was angered by the acquiescence of some
members of the professoriate to political pressures that
gradually corrupted academic freedom (Shils, 1973).
speech entitled,

In a

"The Alleged 'Academic Freedom' of the

German Universities," Weber concluded with the following:
... it should be required in the interest of good
taste and truthfulness that henceforward we ought
not to speak of the existence of 'the freedom of
science and teaching'
been done.

in Germany, as it has always

The fact is that the alleged academic

freedom is obviously bound up with the espousal of
certain views which are politically acceptable in
court circles and in salons....

If it is, it should

be honorably admitted, but we should not delude
ourselves that we in Germany possess the same
freedom of scientific and scholarly teaching which
is taken for granted in

[other]

countries...

{1973,

17-18).
Weber believed that professors were too willing to
conform their political views to those of the state.

He

was convinced that the German professoriate was deceiving
itself if it thought,

that by allowing the state to

continue to dictate the parameters of academic freedom,
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it could avoid enfeebling the very prestige and
scholarship it was laboring so hard to protect.

Near the

turn of the century, Robert Michels, a young scholar who
had grown discouraged by the lengthy process he had to
endure in seeking a professorial chair in Germany,
accepted a teaching post in Italy.

Weber pointed out

that the delays Michels' encountered in the Prussian
Ministry of Education were based upon officials'
awareness of his support for a political agenda that was
contrary to that of the state and not concerns related to
his teaching qualifications.

This manifestation of the

ever-tightening governmental criteria for professorial
conduct was interpreted by Weber as a manipulation of
academic freedom (Lilge, 1975; Craig, 1978; McClelland,
1980) .

It was this manipulation that Weber believed

would render the university "incapable of offering any
resistance to public opinion or to the government because
of the weakening of their moral authority"

(1980, 269).

The Weimar Years
This period in German history began with the
conclusion of World War I and the signing of the peace
treaty at Versailles in 1919

(Kagan et al., 1983).

designated by the Treaty, the German government was

As
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reestablished as a republic under a new constitution.
Most of the officials in this new Weimar Republic
supported the Treaty of Versailles.

These officials had

alienated many of the professoriate by agreeing to a
Treaty that forced Germany to succeed all of its overseas
territories and to pay war reparations, both of which
drained the same national treasury that was the source of
professorial funding (Hasluck, 1938; Kelly, 1972).
The Republic, because it was implementing the
stipulations of a Treaty that symbolized international
resentment toward Germany, was seen b y many university
professors as representing the desires of the
international community and not those of the German
people

{Kelly, 1972).

The Weimar g o v e r n m e n t s inability

to maintain the professoriate's pre-World War I funding
level along with the preferential treatment it gave to
international interests diminished its sway over many
university faculties

(Hasluck, 1938) .

Another reason that the Weimar Republic was disliked
by German professors was that many of its bureaucratic
positions were filled by Jews.

Most Germans believed

that Jews were working within the Wiemar Republic because
they held to the same internationalist views as did the
government

(Lilge, 1975; Craig, 1978).

The resentment

that was developing within many university faculties for
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Jews, who already held a disproportionate number of
faculty positions in light of their numbers within the
population, was deepened by the Republic's willingness to
continue to fill some vacant faculty positions with
Jewish candidates.

These factors made it a simple matter

to justify the anti-semitic bias generally held by the
German professoriate

(Kelly, 1972).

Such anti-semitism was apparent in the willingness
of the faculty of the University of Munich to deny Hans
Nawiasky, a Jewish professor of law at the university,
his right to academic freedom.

During the early 1930s,

in one of his international law classes, Nawiasky stated
that one sovereign state can legally establish power over
another b y means of a peace treaty,
Versailles

such as the Treaty of

(Gay, 1968; Gallin, 1986).

When his statement

was challenged by angry gatherings of nationalistically
motivated students, the university faculty did not
support Nawiasky's right to make such a comment under the
principle of Lehrfreiheit

(Ringer,

1969; Grunberger,

1971) .
The professors were unable to see that, if
Nawiasky's academic freedom could be questioned, their's
could also be in jeopardy.

The Nawiasky case illustrated

that the German professoriate had undergone another
drastic change.

They had come to the point of being
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willing to delimit the academic freedom of one of their
peers if they disapproved of his political beliefs or
ethnic background

(Gay, 1968; Ringer 1969; Grunberger,

1971).

The Nazi Nexus
When Adolph Hitler became the Chancellor of the
Third Reich on January 30, 1933, he immediately called
for the establishment of a totalitarian racial state.

He

did not want any individual to hold a state office if he
was not of Aryan racial heritage or if he held political
opinions contrary to those of the National Socialists
(Kneller, 1941; Grunberger, 1971; Kelly, 1972).
With full knowledge of Hitler's commitment to this
policy, a coalition of professors who held university
chairs, signed and presented a manifesto to the
citizenry, asking them to support Hitler's party in the
March 1933 election.

This professorial effort aided the

National Socialists in gaining a majority in the
Reichstag on election day

(Bentwich, 1953; Beyerchen,

1977).

the newly-elected Reichstag

On April 7, 1933,

then passed Hitler's "Cleansing of the Civil Service
Act."

This law stated that:

"Officials who are not of

Aryan origin are to be dismissed...-Officials whose
previous political activities do not offer the assurance
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that they will invariably and unreservedly support the
National state must be dismissed

(1953, 1)."

This

legislation meant that the National Socialist Party
(Nazi) had created a totalitarian Aryan state that
desired to control people--only the right people for
membership, to control existing ideas--only the right
knowledge, and finally, to control thinking--only the
right political teachings

(1953).

The civil Service Act legitimized Nazi removal of
over 1200 scholars and scientists from the educational
system

(Van de Graaff, 1975; Bentwich,

1953).

The

majority of these scholars were either Jews or in
sympathy with the Weimar internationalist agenda.
Many members of the German professoriate did not protest
these dismissals since Jewish professors had been
scapegoated partly due to the status of the job market.
The Jews, who constituted only one per cent of the entire
German population, held one eighth of the professorial
positions available in the universities.

The Nazis and

many professors found this situation to be intolerable as
they felt that Jews had been given positions by the
Weimar government that would have otherwise been
available to "Aryan" Germans
and Borden,

1983).

(Hartshorn, 1937; Jackman
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In addition to professorial cooperation, the Nazis
had the support of many university students.

The Gentian

Students Association participated in the campaign,
"Against the Un-German Spirit," a movement that was
climaxed on May 10, 1933 by the public burning at the
University of Berlin of over 20,000 books.

These volumes

had been singled out either because their content was
unsympathetic to the Nazi cause or they had been authored
by Jews

{Kneller, 1941; Jackman and Borden, 1983).

The

May 10th destruction marked another instance when
academic freedom had been delimited by political
activists who determined that the accomplishment of their
agenda was of greater significance than that of the
"freedom of teaching"

{Kandel, 1935; Hartshorn,

1937).

Hitler had effectively begun to negate the essence of
academic freedom in German universities.
Hitler's agenda was to implement ever-increasing
degrees of governmental control over various aspects of
academia.

The first step had been the passage of the

"Cleansing of the Civil Service Act" in 1933 whereby he
took control over who did and did not teach.

Although

academic freedom provided for the appointment of new
faculty members by nomination of professors and the
election of Deans and rectors by the professoriate,

this

new law gutted the concept by eliminating certain groups
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from the nominating process for university teaching
positions.

The state was now solely responsible for

determining who would and who would not teach in German
universities

(Ringer, 1969; Gallin,

1986).

Not satisfied with controlling "who" taught in the
universities, the Nazi Party then moved to control "what"
was taught.

The "Law to Prevent Overcrowding of German

Schools and Universities" was passed on April 26, 1933
(Kelly, 1972; Gallin, 1986).

It defined the mission of

the universities as providing an education that would
facilitate a student's ability to carry out the "national
purpose."

No longer were universities to be institutions

dedicated to the ideal of scholarship, they were now
carefully coordinated instruments of the state with the
sole purpose of assisting in the attainment of national
policy (Kandel, 1935; Samuel and Thomas,

1971).

In 1935,

the "Nuremberg Laws" gave even a broader scope to Nazi
anti-semitic policy by calling for the dismissal of any
teacher with a Jewish wife (Joughin,
according to the German newspaper,

1969).

By 1938,

Frankfurter Zeitung.

"one-third of the total teaching staffs of all
universities had been retired or 'transferred'11 (1969,
131) .
Under Hitler's Reich,

the professoriate was

"cleansed" of any dissidents and became little more than
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an undisguised instrument of Nazi propaganda.
freedom was exterminated.

Academic

The professoriate's abdication

of its obligation to defend the freedom of its own along
with the freedoms of its nation created an opportunity
for leaders with their own agendas to infiltrate the
university.

Once these invaders took hold of the

structures of academic freedom,

it was too late for the

professoriate to defend its sacred ground.

CHAPTER 5

THE EVOLUTION OF THE AMERICAN MODEL OF ACADEMIC FREEDOM
1700-1940

Introduction
The evolution of the American model of academic
freedom centered around the struggle of professors for
intellectual liberty.

They believed that their status as

free men included the right not to conform their
thoughts, lectures, or writings to any particular set of
beliefs.

Other groups however, in positions of authority

in ecclesiastical, collegiate, political, and financial
realms believed that their status entitled them to place
limitations upon a professor's intellectual liberty.
This struggle was first manifested after the American
Revolution.

After the Revolution
With the end of the American Revolution in the
1780s, the motivation for higher education in the United
States became one of utility.

The classically-based

curriculum of the colonial college was suddenly being
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called upon to produce graduates who could lead this new
nation into a period of remarkable discovery and
expansion

(French, 1964; Herbst, 1982) .

Response to the

call for a more utilitarian education led to the
introduction of more professional chairs such as medicine
and law to college faculties.

This reaction to the

demand for utility allowed for the expansion of the role
of the professoriate in American higher education to that
of assuming control over dynamic aspects of these newly
formed professional schools.

Professors, rather than

boards and administrators, now had the authority to
"announce standards of admission and performance and
publicly confer honors for meritorious achievement"
(1982, 161).

The professors became more involved in the

innovative aspects of curriculum reform and were
considered the experts and authorities in fields that
were being acknowledged by boards and administrators as
increasing in complexity.
The innovative academic programs that were being
introduced into higher education brought with them a need
for more funds, which required increased funding from
state sources.

With the need for more money came the

willingness of administrators and board members to adopt
the views of their legislative benefactors and to censor
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those professors who did not perpetuate the same beliefs
(French, 1964; Portman,

1972).

One clear illustration of the influence that
political agendas now had on academic affairs was the
conflict between faculties and their boards that arose
.around the question of slavery.

There were professors

with strong views on both sides of this issue.

By the

early 1800s, slavery had become both the touchstone for
debate as well as the cornerstone for bias.

If a

professor made his views known on this issue and they
were not in concordance with those of his college's board
or president, the professor could be sanctioned in an
administrative effort to maintain the college's
supportive stance with governmental officials
and Metzger, 1955; Veysey, 1965).

(Hofstadter

A professor's right to

pursue and teach the truth was held hostage to the whims
of partisan politics.

He was still subject to reprisals

by individuals in authority who viewed him, not as a
"guardian" of intellectual verity, but as a "hawker" of
factional interests.

The Impact of the German Model
During the 1800s, approximately ten thousand
American students matriculated in German universities.
Many of these scholars went to Germany because they were
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firmly convinced that the scholarship of American
colleges was vastly inferior to that of universities such
as Gottingen and Berlin.

American ante-bellum colleges

offered meager libraries and mediocre research
facilities.

To students seeking a more scholarly

education, such deficiencies were only heightened when
viewed with the possibility of pursuing their studies
abroad at prestigious universities in the company of
like-minded intellectuals
Metzger,

(Thwing, 1928; Hofstadter and

1955; Veysey, 1965).

While in Germany,

these scholars were exposed to the

concept of academic freedom and studied in universities
where the principles of Lehrfreiheit. the freedom of
teaching and inquiry, and Lernfreiheit. the freedom to
learn had been put into practice.

The intellectual

liberty enjoyed by the German professoriate was an
intoxicating phenomenon for many American scholars
(Thwing, 1928; Hofstadter and Metzger,
1965).

1955; Veysey,

The interpretation of the German professoriate's

freedom as recounted by Edward Tyrrell Channing, a
celebrated American professor of rhetoric, is reflective
of the high esteem in which many American scholars held
the liberty accorded their German professors:
The first

(advantage]

is an extreme freedom, and, as

I should call it, latitudinarianism in thinking,
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speaking, writing, and teaching on all subjects,
even law, religion, and politics... A more perfect
freedom, and in most cases a more perfect use and
indulgence of it cannot be imagined than is now to
be found in Germany; and nobody can read the books
published, without observing their high abstract
nature, and seeing that their free tone is derived
almost, perhaps altogether,

from the general

character of the prevalent metaphysics

(1928, 30-

31) .
This atmosphere of "extreme freedom" perceived by
American students as being allotted to German professors,
whether in their lecture halls or in their writings, was
assimilated into the educational philosophy of many of
the returning scholars. Professor Paul Russell Pope of
Cornell University concluded that,

"more...than the

concrete amassing of facts,.,[he] owed to German
universities new intellectual...principles:
from prejudices...free intellectually,
(quoted in Thwing, 1928, 63).
would

A mind freed

free spiritually"

For these scholars,

"it

[become] the assumption that academic freedom, like

academic searching, defined the true university"
(Hofstadter and Metzger,

1955, 393) .

Having once studied

in such an environment, many of these returning
"professors-to-be" strove to impress upon the system of
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higher education in America the necessity of recognizing
that one of the measures of the stature of a university
was the extent of the liberties enjoyed by its
professoriate (1928).
Upon returning to the United States in the latter
part of the 1800s, these scholars took the German model
of academic freedom and began to reshape it to fit
colleges and universities in a democratic nation peopled
with citizens who constitutionally were guaranteed the
right to freedom of speech.

It was this professorial

demand for freedom of esqpression both inside and outside
the walls of academia, i.e., the right of intra- and
extra-mural utterance, that led to confrontations between
professors and college presidents, boards of trustees and
financial supporters
Veysey,

(Thwing, 1928; Rudolph, 1962;

1965).

One instance where a professor's attempts to
establish the right to extend academic freedom to include
"extra-mural utterance" involved a conflict between
Professor of Economics Edward A. Ross and Mrs. Leland
Stanford.

Professor Ross was dismissed from the Stanford

faculty in 1900 after he had stated that he believed that
municipal ownership of public transportation was
preferable to its being controlled by big business
interests.

Such a position was diametrically opposed to
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that of the university's financial matriarch, Mrs. Leland
Stanford, whose husband had made much of his fortune in
the railroad business.

She was convinced that Professor

Ross could not "entertain such rabid ideas

[about big

business] without inculcating them in the minds of the
students under his charge"

(Hofstadter and Metzger,

1955,

439) and that he could no longer be trusted to teach at
the university (1955; Brubacher and Rudy, 1958; Veysey,
1965; Joughin,

1969).

A subsequent investigation into

the "Ross Case" b y the American Economic Association led
to the conclusion that Professor Ross' dismissal by Mrs.
Stanford had been substantially based upon his
"utterances and beliefs" and that his right to extra
mural utterance had been violated (1955, 445).
By the beginning of the 1900s, many professors felt
that they still had no arena to which they could go to
petition redress for what they considered to be
infringements upon their right to academic freedom. It
was this frustration and uncertainty within the ranks of
the American professoriate that led to the founding of
the American Association of University Professors in
1915, an organization devoted to the protection of the
academic freedom of university and college professors
(Hofstadter and Metzger,

1955; Brubacher and Rudy, 1958).
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The American Association of University Professors
In response to the futility and apprehension voiced
by its membership, the Committee on Academic Freedom and
Academic Tenure of the American Association of University
Professors presented, during its first year, the 1915
Declaration of Principles.

This document contained the

following statement:
It is better for students to think about heresies
than not to think at all; better for them to climb
new trails, and stumble over error if need be, than
to ride forever in upholstered ease in the
overcrowded highway.

It is a primary duty of a

teacher to make a student take an honest account of
his stock of ideas, throw out the dead matter, place
revised price marks on what is left, and try to fill
his empty shelves with
Joughin,

new

goods (as quoted

in

1969, 171).

Professors wanted the freedom to teach their
students how to critically assess new ideas so that they
could determine which should be accepted and how to
critique old concepts so that they could calculate which
should be discarded.

They considered that it was their

obligation or purpose to "inquire into the validity of
all beliefs and [to] search

for

new perspectives

and

fresh knowledge"

and

Henderson,

170) .

(Henderson

1975,

•
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They were determined to hold fast to this purpose even
though their tenacity frequently set them at odds with
groups in and out of the institutions of higher education
at which they taught

(1975).

College presidents and boards of trustees were two
such groups.

Many believed that professors whose

lectures or writings did not support the institution's
agenda would be working at cross-purposes with the goals
of that college or university.

They were concerned that

allowing professors to voice such "contrary11 opinions
could possibly even divert potential financial
benefactors and political supporters of the institution
(Hofstadter and Metzger,

1955).

In spite of the united front against academic
freedom that was initially presented by college
presidents and boards of trustees, many members of the
professoriate were determined not to acquiesce to
attempts to infringe upon their rights.

Professors

believed that, in order to adequately explore new
horizons of truth, they must continue to press for the
dimensions of intra- and extra-mural utterance that was
supported by the AAUP.

Its Committee's report stated

that "... teachers should be exempt from all restraints as
to the matter or manner of their utterances,
within or without the university"

either

(as quoted in Joughin,
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1969, 173.)

The AAUP had taken a firm stand against

attempts to muzzle a professor's voicing of his views
beyond the confines of the institution of higher
education of which he was a member.

Any concern that a

college president or board might have that potential
financial benefactors, or political allies could in some
way be offended by a professor's pronouncement of his
views did not move the AAUP from its position as an
advocate for this tenet of academic freedom (Alberty and
Bode, 1938; Karier, 1986).

The AAUP was able to

successfully press institutions of higher education to
accept its agenda. It did so through the negative
publicity produced by its formal censuring of any college
or university that had violated a professor's academic
freedom.

What made AAUP censuring such a powerful tool,

so powerful in fact that colleges and universities often
voluntarily changed their policies to conform to AAUP
guidelines, was that it played upon the same fear of
unfavorable public opinion that was often the impetus
behind attempts to muzzle faculty members

{Baade, 1964;

French, 1964).

The Impact of War
The entrance of the United States into World W ar I
in 1917 set the stage for a conflict that tested the
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resolve of those professors who supported the tenets of
the 1915 Declaration and those boards and administrators
who saw the need to position their institutions as
supporters of nationalistic policies.

The primary issue

of concern was whether or not it was legitimate to place
limits upon a professor's individual freedom during a
time of extreme national emergency.

In other words, was

it appropriate to ask members of the professoriate to
keep silent about their positions on sensitive issues
(Beard and Beard, 1930; Brubacher and Rudy, 1958;
Finkelstein, 1984).
In response to this conflict,

the AAUP appointed a

committee on Academic Freedom in Wartime.

Their report

supported the view that war brought with it the need to
place some restrictions upon the liberty of university
professors in reference to the "rights and obligations of
free speech"

(Report, 1918, 29).

The committee did say,

however, that no more restraints should be placed upon
university professors than were put upon other citizens.
Its report states that university professors "should be
subject to the inhibitions which, because of the
exigencies of war, the government m ay enjoin upon all
citizens alike, and to those inhibitions alone"
33) .

(1918,
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The fact that the AAUP supported any limitations
upon the civil liberties of professors seemed to some
members of the professoriate to be in direct
contradiction of their endorsement of professorial
freedom of speech stated in the 1915 Declaration.
Although the members of the committee did have some
supporters among the AAUP membership,

they were depicted

in some corners as having surrendered that high ground
which had so eloquently been captured in 1915
1953; Hofstadter and Metzger, 1955).

(Bentwich,

A n article in The

Nation went so far as to say that "The Committee...had
handed over the keys of the castle to the enemy"

(1955,

504) .
In spite of the disappointment that surrounded the
Report of the Committee on Academic Freedom in Wa r t i m e ,
the AAUP's 1915 Declaration still served for almost a
decade as a basis for the Association's investigations
into alleged infringements upon professorial academic
freedom.

By 1925, however,

it had become apparent to

those working on such investigations that the case load
was increasing beyond the ability of the AAUP to
adequately investigate.

As a result,

in 1925 several

national educational societies such as the Association of
University Women, American Association of University
Professors, Association of Governing Boards, Association
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of Land Grant Colleges, Association of Urban
Universities, National Association of State Universities,
and the American Council on Education met together with
the intent of coming up with a joint statement on
academic freedom.

After considerable debate,

the

Conference adopted the 1925 Statement on Academic Freedom
and Tenure.

The primary accomplishment of this new

statement was its having been adopted by several
educational organizations that would result in a broader
base of support for the tenets of academic freedom as
well as an increase in the number of arenas where
professors could go to voice their grievances
and Bode, 1938; Bentwich,

(Alberty

1953).

Professorial Persistence
Efforts to ensure that the American model of
academic freedom would be the standard for intellectual
freedom in institutions of higher education throughout
the country met another roadblock less than ten years
after the adoption of the 1925 Statement of Principles.
This time the issue was teacher loyalty oath legislation.
The Stock Market Crash of 1929 had led the wa y to the
Great Depression; American institutions of higher
education were not exempt from the severe economic
realities of the period.

In addition to the short supply
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of funds during the 1930s, there also was a wave of ant i 
communist fever sweeping the country.

Being connected,

even indirectly, to individuals who supported communism
brought immediate criticism from the public.

As a result

of these two perspectives, many college presidents and
boards of trustees were deeply concerned.

They feared

that having members of their faculties voicing views that
were not clearly nationalistic and claiming protection
under the umbrella afforded b y academic freedom could
lead to the demise of their institutions since it could
result in lessened government and private financial
support as well as lowered enrollment figures.

Adding to

this pressure being exerted upon those professors whose
views were being questioned was the passage of teacher
loyalty legislation in over twenty states.

Legislators

were reluctant to fund educational institutions whose
faculty members held views they considered to be in
sympathy with communism.

These concerns made them

willing to vote in favor of loyalty oaths

(Knight and

Hall, 1951).
A professor's right to the unhindered pursuit and
expression of the truth was once again being questioned.
The 1937 Statement of Committee B of the AAUP interpreted
the movement for loyalty oaths as "a manifestation of an
essentially un-American temper.. . [and] the insidious

78
beginning of a movement hostile to what is best and most
fundamental in our political principles and our national
ideals"

(Conference, 1937, 32).

They contended that such

oaths would constitute an unwarranted limitation of
academic freedom as "the statute's intent was to cause
professors to refrain from criticizing or suggesting
changes in the fundamental law of the country"
and Bode,

(Alberty

1938, 323).

Reflective of the existence across academia of
support for the AAUP's stand against such legislation was
an article written by Judge Ogden L. Mills,

"A Harvard

M a n on Academic Freedom," that was published in the
University of Chicago Magazine.

The Honorable Judge

Mills wrote:
That

[a professor's] views do not coincide with

those of a governing b o a r d . ..may be unfortunate, but
to ask him to remain silent unless his opinions
conform to theirs, would be to limit his right as a
citizen,

to deprive him of part of his liberty and

to impose humiliating restrictions unacceptable to
independent and high-minded men.

Any university

attempting to enforce such a censorship would soon
cease to attract preeminent men who combine
independence of mind with sound scholarship,

the
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very men who bring it strength and vitality (Alberty
and Bode,

1938, 153).

Judge Mills' perspective not only underscores the fact
that professors are citizens and, as such, are entitled
to the right of free speech--he also focuses in on
another very important point, that institutions
supportive of such measures would likely be unable to
attract individuals with the level of scholarship so
necessary to the survival of any college or university.
That these points were understood by some college
presidents is made clear in an article written in 1938 by
Alexander Meiklejohn,

the President of Amherst.

He comes

out in full support of the maintenance of academic
freedom not only as a professorial right but also as a
necessary policy decision for those institutions that
wanted to maintain high levels of scholarship.

He argued

that the intellectual welfare of the people is placed in
jeopardy when the freedom to deal with controversial
issues by that nation's professoriate is in any way
hindered.

Furthermore, he explained that "the health and

effectiveness of our national education depend upon our
keeping it in active touch with the fundamental
controversies of our society"

(Meiklejohn, 1938, 22).

He

firmly believed, as did Judge Mills, that teachers must
be permitted to discuss controversial issues and that in
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that liberty lay not only the welfare of truth but also
that of higher education.
The controversy surrounding teacher loyalty
legislation persuaded the membership of the AAUP to
formulate their 1940 statement of Principles and
Interpretive Comments on Academic Freedom and Ten u r e .
This document became the most widely known and endorsed
statement of academic freedom in the United States
1993).

(Poch,

The process of its formulation began in 1934 when

the American Association of Colleges, which was formed by
college presidents largely out of a desire to establish
an organization that would be as helpful in pressing
their agenda as the AAUP had been in furthering that of
professors, and the American Association of University
Professors began a series of joint conferences on the
most expedient and beneficial means whereby to implement
the principles of academic freedom in institutions of
higher education.

The end result of these meetings was

the aforementioned statement, which presented as its
fundamental purpose to "...promote public understanding
and support of academic freedom and tenure and an
agreement upon procedures to assure them in colleges and
universities"

(Joughin, 1969, 2).

Included in those

procedures was a delineation of four particular arenas in
which the professoriate were to be entitled to an
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unhindered pursuit of the truth:

research, publication

of research findings, lecturing, and intra- and extra
mural communication (1993, 11).
The value and import of the 1940 Statement was not
reflected solely in the principles of academic freedom
and tenure that were once again presented in it, even
though the need for such a re-articulation was necessary
if for no other reason than there had been repeated
attempts to limit those principles.

Instead, its very

existence stands as a testimony to the unwavering
commitment of members of the American professoriate to
refuse to relinquish any of their Constitutionallyguaranteed rights merely because they had chosen to be
educators; that, although being part of the teaching
profession carries with it considerable privileges,

those

privileges are counterbalanced by an equally considerable
number of responsibilities to the society in which those
privileges are resident.

CHAPTER 6
THE EVALUATION OF THE INFLUENCE OF ACADEMIC FREEDOM
IN GERMANY AND AMERICA
UPON THE CAREERS OF FOUR SCIENTISTS

Introduction
A n essential component in a system of higher
education is the professoriate.

In order for there to be

a transmission of the knowledge contained in university
libraries, research institutes, and programs of study,
colleges or universities must be comprised of faculties
who can successfully convey such information to students.
As the professoriate plays a fundamental role in this
process,

the presence or absence of academic freedom

influences the ability to transmit truth.

The political

climate in which the professoriate functions acts as
either a catalyst for or deterrent to the exercise of
this academic freedom.

The Legislative Onslaught
On January 30, 1933, Adolph Hitler took office as
the Chancellor of Germany; this position in the German
Reich afforded him the electoral power that he needed to

82

83
carry out his political agenda (Franklin,

1981).

Two

months later, he addressed a letter to German President
Paul von Hindehburg expressing the rational behind his
impending legislative assault against the Jews, whose
presence within Germany he was determined to remove

(Tal,

1982).
Hitler believed that the Jewish influence in the
academic arenas of "law, medicine, and the like"

(Tal,

1982, 5), was detrimental to the German nation and that
it

had to be ended.

His letter to von Hindenburg

contained his three reasons for

this contention. First,

he

was convinced that, in light of the percentage of Jews

in

the German population, their disproportionate

representation in positions of authority and
responsibility in the government kept "disadvantaged,
true Germans" out of work (1982).
Second, Hitler considered the Jews to be a "foreign
body"

(Tal, 1982, 5) with enough economic leverage in

Germany to sabotage any of his efforts to cure the
economy, the society, and the state.

Third, he firmly

believed that the Jews could not be trusted to support
the foreign and domestic policies of the Reich (Kevles,
1978; 1982).
Hitler's anti-semitism was based upon what he
considered to be a competition for living space and
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national dominance.

He believed that the Jews were

members of a separate nation, not individuals who could
be citizens of any nation-state.

He further considered

Jews as comprising a corporate entity grappling for
domination of a foreign nation
1984).

(Kevles, 1978; Gordon,

Therefore, according to Hitler's concept of

national sovereignty, every nation comprised of an
indigenous "race" had to fight to maintain its own living
space.

As long as Jews remained in any nation,

threatened "the political, military,

they

economic, cultural,

and racial strength of those nations among whom they were
dispersed"

(1984, 95).

Accordingly, Hitler felt that if this internal
struggle between Jew and non-Jew were permitted to
continue, his country might loose its pre-ordained
geographical position in history.

As Hitler was

determined that Germany would achieve the world
domination for which he believed it was pre-destined, he
considered it a political necessity for him to remove all
Jews, both within Germany's own borders and within every
nation that it annexed (Proctor,

1988).

Hitler focused upon the Jewish professors primarily
because of his concern that they would spread their
"Jewishness" by contaminating those students who would be
the future leaders of nationalistic Germany.

He was
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determined to use the universities as a tool for the
advancement of his own political agenda (Jackman and
Borden,

1983).

In revitalizing the German spirit, Hitler

first assaulted academic freedom.

He believed that only

through a conquest over and control of the intellectual
freedom of the professoriate would the goals of the
government,

"honor to the Fatherland and restoration of

Germanic lands to the Reich"

(Gallin, 1986, 87) be

attained.
Within two months after becoming Chancellor, Hitler
began his legislative attack against the Jewish members
of the civil service, which included university
professors.

His first move was to introduce the Law for

the Re-establishment of the Professional Civil Service to
the German Reichstag (Tal, 1982; Gallin, 1986).
This law was aimed at removing Jewish or non-Aryan
(according to Nazi doctrine, individuals whose parents or
grand-parents were Jewish Caucasians) employees from the
civil service.

Specifically, the law stipulated that

non-Aryan professors were to be retired and that n o n 
tenured, non-Aryan professors were to be dismissed.
addition,

In

it revoked the "eligibility for citizenship"

status of all Jewish faculty who had become naturalized
citizens after November,

1918.

In order to accept a

faculty chair at a state university, professors, if they
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held foreign citizenship, had to become naturalized
citizens of Germany.

Therefore,

this legislation not

only meant the loss of a faculty position, it also meant
the loss of German citizenship (Hartshorne, 1937; Jackman
and Borden,

1983).

The Law for the Re-establishment of the Professional
Civil Service had within it several exemptions.

First,

its restrictions did not apply to individuals who had
been employed by the state during World War I.

This

meant that those Jews who were university professors
during World War I would not be dismissed.

Second,

persons who themselves had fought on the front lines or
who had had a father or son killed in World War I were
excluded from dismissal from their government positions.
This was due,

in part, to Hitler's desire to appease

those members of the Reichstag who would feel comradeship
with World War I veterans.

These exemptions did not last

long, however (Beyerchen, 1977; Tal, 1982).
Between 1933 and 1939, the few exemptions allowed by
this law were systematically eliminated by German courts
and legislatures through the passage of some 400 pieces
of anti-semitic legislation (Weinberg,

1986).

The most

famous of these statutes were the series of Nuremberg
Laws passed in 1935.

These laws were used to further

cleanse the German population of unwanted, non-Aryan,
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elements.

One of these laws stipulated that if an Aryan

professor had a Jewish wife, he would be dismissed
because intimacy with a Jew would taint his Aryan nature.
Another Nuremberg Law was the Reich Citizenship Law of
September 15, which served to delineate the difference
between individuals who were citizens and those who were
residents.

A citizen was defined as a person of pure

Aryan blood who was willing and able to serve the German
people and nation.

A resident was defined as anyone of

non-Aryan blood, including all Jews, who were,
conversely, not eligible to serve the German people and
nation (Proctor, 1988; Muller, 1991).
A third piece of Nuremberg legislation was the Law
for the Protection of German Blood and German Honor.

It

forbade marriage and sexual relations between Jews and
non-Jews.

This Blood Protection Law specified which

groups could intermarry.

It also forbade Jews from

employing German servants under the age of 45.

The

intent of this latter stipulation was that no German
would be in a position of “taking orders" from a Jew.
The final Nuremberg Law, passed a month later, on October
18, was the Law for the Protection of the Genetic Health
of the German People (Proctor, 1988; Muller, 1991).
Since Jews were considered to be genetically inferior to
Aryans,

it required Jewish couples to be examined before
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marriage in order to determine if they might pass on any
"racial damage" that was believed to be inherent among
Jews

(1988, 132).
Collectively, all of these laws segregated the

Jewish professor from his fellow countrymen.
was he a citizen, he was a resident.

No longer

No longer was he a

teacher in search of the truth, he was classified as a
dispenser of anti-German propaganda. No longer was he a
researcher who shared his findings with his students, he
was now considered an alien without a country, and
relegated to being an inquirer without a laboratory, and
a teacher without a lecture h a l l .

He represented racial

pollution rather than scholastic purity.

He was anathema

to all he held sacred in academia.

The Adulteration of German Science
The Civil Service Laws as well as the Nuremberg
Legislation of the 1930s both had a devastating effect
upon the universities of Germany and the academic freedom
of their professoriate.

For the government to stipulate

Aryanism as a criterion for professorial appointments was
a violation of the principle of academic self-government.
No longer was a candidate for a university position
accepted or rejected by the faculty based upon his
teaching ability and his competency in his subject area.
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Instead, racial purity and political adherence to Nazi
policy had become the determining factors
1937; Rodes,

(Hartshorne,

1964; Lilge, 1975).

Scientific work in Germany was severely limited by
these legislative measures,

since they served to restrict

the output of institutions of higher education by
hobbling the intellectual freedom of the professoriate.
Particularly desolated were those institutions of higher
education that were involved in scientific research.
Between the years 1933 and 1935, approximately 1,150 nonAryan scientists were dismissed or forced to retire.
Among these were many illustrious scholars, several of
whom had either already won the Nobel Prize or would soon
achieve laureate status
1977; Nachmansohn,

(Hartshorne,

1937; Beyerchen,

1979).

Professor David Hilbert, who was a member of the
faculty of the famous Mathematics and Physics Department
of the University of Gottingen lamented as to the
destruction that "racial purity" had brought to the
University's science departments.

When in a meeting in

1934 the Nazi Minister of Science, Education and Popular
Culture, Bernhard Rust, asked Hilbert about the faculty.
Reflecting on the catastrophic impact of Hitler's
policies, Hilbert responded,

" [The faculty]

just does not
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exist....It was destroyed when its most illustrious
leaders were simply chased away"

{Nachmansohn, 1979, 45).

The Kaiser Wilhelm Institute of Physics also
suffered a terrible blow.

Of its highly qualified

scientists, a quarter were either dismissed or retired
due to the stipulations of the Civil Service Act.

The

departure of so many exceptional faculty without
consultation with other members of the professoriate was
a violation of the principle of Lehrfreiheit.

This mass

exodus left the Institute without the leadership
necessary to give it the direction it required.

As a

result, the Nazi Ministry of Education had the
opportunity to slowly redefine the course of German
science.

No longer was "theoretical" science the star in

the academic crown of the German university; instead,
science was limited to practical applications
1953; Van de Graaff, 1975).

(Bentwich,

The new Reich neither valued

nor condoned the long-term, theoretical approach to
German science that had been the mark of "Jewish"
professors.

Instead,

it wanted a science that would

provide short-term, practical solutions for problems in
industry, agriculture, and defense {Kevles, 1978;
Nachmansohn, 1979).
Positions formerly occupied by elite theoretical
scientists were now filled by men who were more concerned
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with the furtherance of Nazi ideology and practical
advancements than with the elevation of German science
(Muller, 1991).

The Minister of Education promoted into

positions of leadership two strongly anti-semitic, Nobel
Prize-winning physicists, Johannes Stark and Philip
Lenard.

Both of these men were committed to replacing

irrelevant "Jewish" theory with sound "German"
practicality.

Stark and Lenard even opposed the

distinguished German Physical Society solely because they
considered it to have been dominated by Jews.

As German

scientists, more importantly as "Nazi German" scientists,
they were convinced that adhering to the politicallymotivated criteria of the Nazi agenda instead of to the
standards of the international scientific community was
an appropriate academic measure for determining the worth
of a specific line of research as well as the value of a
particular researcher (Nachmansohn, 1979; Macrakis,
1993) .

Lenard, who made no effort to hide his anti-

semitic feelings, even had the following notice posted on
his office door:

"Entrance to Jews and Members of the

German Physical Society Not Permitted"

(1979, 119).

The intellectual freedom of the German professor was
systematically annihilated through the unrelenting
political onslaught of the Nazi Party.

Hitler had made

his first assault on the spirit of free inquiry within

92
the German university.

In addition to segregation and

relegation to second-class residents/ Jewish members of
the professoriate were no longer free to pursue
theoretical innovation.

As a result,

four elite

scientists had to struggle to find their response.

Albert Einstein in Germany
The career of Albert Einstein before his emigration
from the threats of Nazism reveals the unfolding of a
pattern of intolerance.

His career decisions reflected

an awareness that his ideologies were in conflict with
those of his German Aryan colleagues as well as with
those of officials of the Third Reich.

As early as 1921,

Einstein determined that both his political and
scientific ideas would eventually separate him from his
homeland (French, 1979; Jackman and Borden, 1983).
In June, 1921, Einstein commented to Philipp Frank,
a theoretical physicist and close personal friend
(French, 1979) that,

"I am not likely to remain in

Germany longer than another ten years"
Borden,

1983, 174).

(Jackman and

Einstein had determined the early

signs of a rising provincial and narrow-minded attitude
among his fellow intellectuals in the German universities
(1979; 1983).

His ideas had already begun to cause a

rift between him and his colleagues.
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He and George Nicolai, a professor of physiology at
the University of Berlin, had just co-authored the
"Manifesto to Europeans"

(Clark, 1984, 228).

In this

document, Einstein and Nicolai presented their
internationalist and pacifist ideology.

Their

"Manifesto" was written as a rebuttal to the
nationalistic ideology of the widely-circulated
"Manifesto to the Civilized World," this document,
written by some and endorsed by most of his colleagues,
exonerated Germany from guilt for starting World War I
(Franklin, 1981; 1984).
In his "Manifesto," Einstein pointed out that such
extremely nationalistic attitudes were a detriment to the
cultural cooperation that scholars in every country
should support.

He believed that, if men of science

condoned war, they were doing so to their detriment.

The

volatile environment that was created by conflict would
only serve to undermine international collaboration
necessary for research (Nachmansohn, 1979; Macrakis,
1993) .
Einstein was convinced that research could not
attain its highest level unless a political environment
existed where scholars from different countries could
share with one another.

This conflicted with the

nationalistic ideas of his colleagues who saw the
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emergence of Germany as being linked to the emergence of
the superiority of the German mind.

Clearly, Einstein's

academic anchor was the world; for many of his
colleagues,

it was Germany (Clark, 1984) .

After Einstein's and Nicolai's document was
circulated among the other members of the professoriate
at the University of Berlin, only two signatures were
added.

Most of Einstein's colleagues found his

"Manifesto" to be traitorous, particularly since it
criticized Germany's actions during World War I
(Franklin, 1981).

This overwhelming refutation of his

internationalist-pacifist agenda was representative of
the schism that existed between this world-renowned
scientist and many of his fellow professors (Clark,
1984).

In an arena where a tolerance for the ideas of

others was intended to serve as a guiding force in
professorial relations, he faced a professoriate that was
increasingly open in their antagonism toward his beliefs
(Weinberg, 1986).
In acknowledgement of his inability to garner
support for his ideas among members of the professoriate,
Einstein reluctantly joined the political party, Bund
Neues Vaterland.

He was convinced that the only solution

to the world's problems lay in a substantial surrender of
autonomy by individual countries and governments

(French,
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1979).

Bund neuea Vaterland had as its primary political

objective the establishment of an international
diplomatic body, which through peaceful arbitration,
would make future wars impossible (Clark, 1984).

His

association with this organization was but the laying of
another symbolic brick in the wall that was separating
him from the majority of the German academic community.
Einstein ignited even more animosity with members of
the German professoriate by making several trips to the
United States during the 1920's.

His colleagues were

angered by his willingness to share his scientific
knowledge with "the enemy" that had just defeated Germany
in World War X.

He added even more fuel to their anger

and intolerance by spending time during these trips
raising money to help build a Jewish university in
Jerusalem (Jackman and Borden, 1983; Clark, 1984).
As these events and issues unfolded, Einstein began
to change his political views.

Previously, his

connection to international Jewry had always been based
upon the "pursuit of knowledge for its own sake, an
almost fanatical love of justice and the desire for
personal independence"

(French, 1979, 201).

These

beliefs and values were the features of the Jewish
tradition that had made Einstein grateful to be a Jew
(1979).

He had not seen the need for all Jews to be
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united geographically,

for he had always believed that it

would be through cultural assimilation that the Jew would
eventually find his "homeland.”

However, with the

increasing nationalistic bias of the German professoriate
and the onslaught of Nazi anti-semitism, Einstein began
to realize that the preservation of the Jew could only
occur with the establishment of a Jewish state.
was becoming a Zionist

Einstein

(Bentwich, 1953; 1979; Clark,

1984).
In April, 1933, when the Law for the R e 
establishment of Professional Civil Service was passed,
Albert Einstein was the Director of Theoretical Physics
in the Kaiser Wilhelm institute.

Having held this

position since 1914, he was exempted from dismissal.
However, there was little doubt that he would have been
dismissed under the "politically unreliable" clause of
that same piece of legislation.

This clause stated that

any individual who could not be counted upon to adhere
completely to the National Socialist Party philosophy
would be considered "politically unreliable" an therefore
subject to dismissal.

In any case, Einstein, realizing

the true intent of the law was to ensure "cleansing," and
recognizing the loss of intellectual liberty that it
would bring,

submitted his resignation from the
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Directorship of the Institute of Theoretical Physics
(Beyerchen,

1977; Kevles,

1978).

A few of Einstein's colleagues were willing to
openly risk questioning his treatment by the Nazis.

One

such individual was Dr. M a x von Laue, a distinguished
German physicist.

He reminded the May, 1933 meeting of

the Kaiser Wilhelm Society that the determination by the
Ministry of Education that Einstein's research was
valueless and that his books were traitorous had been
carried out without the government office having
consulted even one member of the Institute's
professoriate.

Von Laue then called upon the Society to

raise objections to their exclusion from the Ministry's
deliberations, as it was a violation of their right to
academic self-government.

The majority of the membership

of the Society, however, voted to support the actions of
the Ministry's Secretary (Kelly,
Macrakis,

1972; Beyerchen,

1977;

1993).

The Society's scholars overrode Einstein's right to
academic freedom by sustaining the Ministry of
Education's decision to debase the content of his
research based upon their intolerance for his pacifism,
internationalism, and non-Aryanism.

In so doing,

they

jeopardized their right to academic self-government
(Gallin, 1986; Macrakis,

1993).

As a result, they
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"betrayed their own freedom and prepared the way for a
totalitarianism that would overwhelm [German academia]"
(1986, 70).
In addition, Einstein also resigned from the
Prussian Academy of Sciences.

Here, too, a lack of

tolerance for his political viewpoint and his racial
heritage reigned.

Upon receipt of Einstein's

resignation, the Academy informed him that "he had let
himself be used by opponents not only of the new German
government, but of the German people as a whole"
(Beyerchen, 1977, 41).

The Academy stated that

Einstein's position as a supporter of the enemies of the
German Reich was "a bitter, painful disappointment for
us, which would probably have necessitated a parting of
the ways even if we had not received your resignation"
(1977, 41).
In response to this resignation, Professor Ma x
Planck, a Nobel Laureate and member of the Prussian
Academy of Sciences, addressed a session of the Academy
on May 11, 1933, the day after Einstein's books had been
among those publicly burned at the University of Berlin
because of their "un-German" spirit.

He compared

Einstein's greatness to that of Kepler and Newton, and
stressed that he hoped posterity would not speak ill of
the Academy for not recognizing Einstein as a great

99
thinker nor perceiving his significance to science.
However,

Planck, being known as having adopted "an

attitude of prudential acquiescence and delaying tactics"
(Wistrich, 1982) balanced his comments by concluding that
Einstein's politics made it impossible for the Academy to
retain him (Beyerchen,

1977).

Planck's straddling of the fence, his attempt at
balancing his support for Einstein with his support for
Nazi policy, became the model for the compromising
position taken by many in the German professoriate during
the initial stages of academic cleansing by the National
Socialists.

This stance stood as a direct assault

against the bulwark of academic freedom.

By choosing

what appeared to be a compromise, the rights of others
could be placed in the balance between what was right and
what was expedient

(Kelly, 1972; Beyerchen, 1977; Gallin,

1986).
When the 1933 Civil Service Act was passed by the
Reichstag. Einstein was out of the country.

After

resigning from both professional positions, he also
decided to renounce his German citizenship.

This man,

who had won the Nobel Prize in 1921, who had become an
internationally respected and honored scientist, and who
had desired only to see science--and in particular,
German science--prosper, had reached a point where German
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citizenship had become,
(Clark, 1984, 564).

for him,

"a strange affair"

His life of allegiance to Germany

had been fraught with repeated instances of political and
racial intolerance.

Although Nazi persecution of the

Jews had moved Einstein to become a Zionist, he still
believed that, personally, as "an internationally-minded
man,

citizenship of a specific country was not important;

[rather] humanity is more important than national
citizenship"

(1984, 564).

With thiB thought in mind,

Einstein formally surrendered his right to full German
citizenship at the German Embassy in Brussels.

Upon

exiting the Embassy, Einstein "left German territory for
the last time"

(1984, 565).

James Pranck in Germany
James Franck, a distinguished German physicist who
received the Nobel Prize in 1925

(Candee, 1957), was a

man content to spend his entire life working within the
halls of academia.

He, like so many of his close

colleagues, felt the world of politics was something that
should remain at a distance from the university.

All of

this changed for Franck when, as a matter of principle,
he made a solitary public protest in opposition to the
policies of the Nazi Party (Gallin, 1986; Macrakis,
1993) .
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In 1921, Franck was offered the chair of the Second
Institute of Physics at the University of Gottingen.
This, for him, was an ideal position.

He was able to

direct his research according to his own interests and to
establish close contacts with the students within his
department.

Such informal relationships were a rare

feature at German universities, where formality generally
prevailed in the communication between professors and
students

(Nachmansohn,

1979; Macrakis,

1993).

By the 1930s, Franck was the leading experimental
physicist in Germany. His accomplishments elevated the
department at Gottingen and led to its being christened
the "Mecca of Atomic Physics"

(Wistrich, 1984, 78). In

1932, he was the foremost candidate for the chair of
physics at the University of Berlin.

He was unable to

accept this position, at this high point in his career,
because of the implementation of the 1933 Civil Service
Law (Nachmansohn, 1979).
The University of Gottingen suffered greatly from
the impact of this legislation.

Within the faculty of

physics, in addition to Franck, a number of other
brilliant Jews held prominent positions.

Upon

notification of the Civil Service Law's passage,

these

men joined Franck in extensive discussions as how to best
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respond to the racist elements of the new law (Bentwich,
1953; Beyerchen, 1977).
Franck, who had been a highly-decorated German
veteran of World War I, was exempt from dismissal
(Bentwich, 1953) .

His ethical dilemma was whether or not

he should retain his position when other Jews would have
to lose theirs

(Beyerchen, 1977).

The principle at stake

was one of academic freedom, in that, by keeping his
position, Franck would be acknowledging and supporting
the right of governmental policy to stipulate who could
or could not teach within the university.

Franck

concluded that, despite his exempted status, he would
have to resign.

He knew that he could not obey a law

that required him to dismiss colleagues on the basis of a
racial heritage that he shared.

Franck became even more

resolute in his decision as he watched the manipulation
of the Nazi-dominated student leadership and witnessed
the response of the professoriate to their actions
(Kelly, 1972; Gallin, 1986).
Where once Franck had brought students together to
pursue truth from many sources, the government now
dictated truth under the guise of ideological purity.
the direction of Joseph Goebbels of the newly formed
Reich Ministry for the Enlightenment of the Volk and
Propaganda, the German Minister of Education re-

At
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established student self-government,
removed during the Weimar years
1972; Gallin,

1986).

which had been

(Bentwich,

1953; Kelly,

On April 13, this newly formed

student government association announced its campaign
"against the Un-German Spirit"

(Beyerchen, 1977, 16).

Within its twelve-point declaration was a pronouncement
that:
The Jew can only think Jewish, and when he writes in
German, he is lying; students should view Jews as
aliens, and Jewish works should appear in Hebrew, or
at least be designated as 'translations' if they
were printed in German; students and professors
should be selected according to their guarantee of
thinking in the German Spirit

(1977, 16).

The German student movement further manifested its
disdain for intellectual liberty when it conducted public
book burnings that it held at nearly every German
university on May 10, 1933 (Kelly, 1972; Gallin, 1986).
Although the students were manipulated into initiating
this campaign, a considerable amount of support existed
among university faculty for the book burnings.

Their

disregard for the right of other professors to hold views
contrary to their own reflected the l o w esteem in which
they held the principle of Lehrfreiheit
Kevles, 1978; Weinberg,

1986).

(Kelly, 1972;

Hans Naumann, professor
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of Germanistics at the University of Bonn, was thrilled
with this movement among the youth.

He wrote that:

We see this action as overpoweringly beautiful,

it

is not to be darkened or endangered through any
human weaknesses.

We want union and purity, hi g h 

mindedness of conviction, subordination and
association.
That is what we want for our hearts and that is
what we also want in our literature....a literature
which educates us...in kinship, be it in the
profession, be it in allegiance or in the race and
the nation.

That

[which] educates us to the state

and to leadership and to obedience and to militant
bearing (1972, 72).
Naumann's interpretation of the destruction of the
findings of intellectuals of the past and of the present
as being "overpoweringly beautiful" reflected the change
in attitude about academic freedom within the Third Reich
that led to its willingness to compromise the right of
professors to publish an unhindered view of the truth
(1972; 1978).
Although Franck's friends and colleagues petitioned
him not to take hasty action, he knew that fundamental
issues of principle were at stake.

On April 17, Franck
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submitted the following letter to the Nazi appointed
Minister of Education:
With these lines I ask you, Mr. Minister, to release
me from my duties as full professor at the
University of Gottingen and Director of the Second
Physical Institute of this University.
This decision is an inner necessity for me
because of the attitude of the government toward
German Jewry (Beyerchen, 1977, 17).
In addition, Franck sent a letter of resignation to
the Rector of the University of Gottingen, a copy of
which he also made available to the Gottinaer Zeituncr.
one of the city's two newspapers:
I have asked my superior authorities to release me
from my office.

I will attempt to continue my

scientific work in Germany.
We Germans of Jewish descent are being treated
as aliens and enemies of the Fatherland.

It is

demanded that our children grow up in the awareness
that they will never be allowed to prove themselves
as Germans.
Whoever was in the war is supposed to receive
permission to serve the state further.

I refuse to

make use of this privilege, even though I also
understand the position of those today who consider
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it their duty to hold out at their posts

(Beyerchen,

1977, 17) .
Such public protest was highly unusual; however,
holding dear the rights of university professors to make
the public aware of those causes that violated the true
German spirit, Franck hoped that, by taking his protest
to the people,

they might be moved to press the

government to alter its anti-semitic policies
1953; Beyerchen,

(Bentwich,

1977).

Franck's letter of protest elicited editorial
support by the Gottinger Zeituna.

The editors wrote that

the World War I honors that Franck had won, his war
record,

and the esteem that he had brought to Gottingen,

all had served to economically benefit the city.

He was

responsible for having increased the number of students
at the University and for securing a Rockefeller Grant to
expand the University's buildings.

The editors stated

that they hoped that Franck's sacrifice would somehow
prevent the dismissal of those individuals who would
otherwise be lost to German science due to the
stipulations of the Civil Service Law (Beyerchen, 1977).
Franck's correspondence was also printed by several
other newspapers throughout Germany.

Most of their

articles contained expressions of concern that
consideration must be given to the possible future

107
implications of such legislation.

In contrast, the

Berliner Tageblatt. stated that Franck would have done
better if he had remained at his post while issuing his
protest against the Nazi regime; in other words, they
felt his resignation was ill-timed and ill-advised
{Fermi, 1987; Beyerchen, 1977).
Franck's story was quickly picked up by the London
Times in an article entitled,

"Treatment of Jews in

Germany, Nobel Prize-Winners Protest" which appeared in
the April 19, 1933 issue.

His actions caused a

definitive split along political ideological lines.

Some

pro-Nazi faculty believed that Franck was placing concern
for his own right to academic freedom above the necessity
for the establishment of the new Reich {Fermi, 1987;
Beyerchen, 1977).
Professors on the medical faculty and in the
agricultural institute of the University of Gottingen
thought that Franck, along with those who had entered
into discussions with him about his resignation, were
conspiring to hinder the national cause.

When the

foreign press used Franck's resignation to support antiGerman propaganda, forty-two instructors at Gottingen
issued a condemnation of Franck's action.

Their "42-

Statement" charged that Franck's public resignation had
impeded the domestic and foreign policy of the new
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government

(Beyerchen, 1977; Weinberg, 1986).

unanimously agreed...that the form of

"We are

[his] declaration

of resignation is equivalent to an act of sabotage, and
we hope that the government will therefore accelerate the
realization of the necessary cleansing measures"

(1977,

19) .
Although Franck recognized their right to disagree
with his actions,

the idea that such actions would

require "cleansing" measures was anathema to the freedom
of dissent that he believed was his right as a German
professor.

Franck contended that loyalty to a national

political agenda did not necessarily have to conflict
with the idea of academic freedom as long as that agenda
allowed conflicting ideas an opportunity to surface and
to be subject to review by the academic community.
However, when nationalistic policy holds that concepts in
conflict with its tenets must be "cleansed" from the
minds of its followers, then the principles of academic
freedom must take precedence so that freedom itself may
remain (Kevles, 1978; Macrakis,

1993).

Although Franck had desired to remain in Germany and
had hoped for a position outside of the Civil Service
from which he could continue his opposition to the
National Socialist Party, the persistent execution of
Nazi policy forced him to concede that he no longer had a
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place within the Fatherland.

His willingness to place

his safety as well as that of his family in jeopardy for
the principles of academic freedom was the act of an
heroic nature that set a precedent for others of like
conviction to follow.

Otto Meyerhof in Germany
Germany,

in 1930, led the world in the fields of

physical and social sciences largely due to the efforts
of excellent German researchers.

However, by 1935, one

out of every five university professors had been removed
from their faculty positions.

The "cleansing" policies

of the National Socialist Party had forced either the
emigration, the retirement, or the imprisonment of some
of Germany's most eminent scientists
Nachmansohn,

(Bentwich, 1953;

1979).

In the area of medicine, the loss was particularly
high due in part to the large representation of Jewish
researchers and physicians in the medical field.

Between

1933 and 1938, 10,000 medical personnel had been forced
to leave their jobs.

Among those either compelled or

coerced into leaving was the Nobel Laureate, Otto
Meyerhof, who was Director of the world-famous Kaiser
Wilhelm Institute of Physiology at Heidelberg (Kevles,
1978; Proctor, 1988).

Although he had hoped, as had so
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many other Jews, that the Nazi regime would not last very
long, his decision to attempt to weather the storm of
Hitler's anti-semitic policies eventually proved to be
untenable

(Beyerchen, 1977; Nachmansohn,

1979).

After leaving the Kaiser Wilhelm Institute of
Biology in Berlin-Dahlem in 1929, Meyerhof took up
residence at the newly-established Kaiser Wilhelm
Institute at Heidelberg.

The Institute was comprised of

four independent research divisions: physics, chemistry,
physiology, and basic medicine.

Meyerhof had been

selected to fill the position of Director of the
Department of Physiology.

For the first time in his

career, he had at his disposal the facilities necessary
to further his sophisticated research.

Not only did he

have the proper facilities, but also superlative
colleagues.

His fame attracted several medical

researchers from around the world to the faculty of the
Institute

(Nachmansohn, 1979; Weinberg,

1986; Proctor,

1988).
The Kaiser Wilhelm Society even built a magnificent
house for him.

Meyerhof had finally achieved what he

considered to be the "dream of a true scientist: not
glory, but the opportunity to carry out his creative work
under the most comfortable, pleasant, and efficient
conditions"

(Nachmansohn,

1979, 283).

While he was in

Ill
the midst of these most active and dynamic years of his
career Hitler became Chancellor of Germany, the Nazi
Party gained control of the Reichstag. and the Law for
the Re-establishment of the Professional Civil Service
was passed

(Fleming and Bailyn, 1969; 1979; Weinberg,

1986).
Meyerhof had qualified as a certified lecturer of
physiology at the University of Kiel in 1912 and had
worked there until 1924 when he achieved the status of
Professor Extraordinary.

That being the case, he, though

a Jew, was exempt from the dismissal policies of the
Civil Service Act under the World W a r I state service
stipulation (Nachmansohn, 1979; Weinberg,

1986).

Although the exemption existed, state officials were
authorized to determine, based upon racial heritage, who
could and could not serve as professors in German
institutions of higher education.
Meyerhof was exempted.

His decision to accept the

exemption, in spite of the governmental manipulation that
it represented, resulted from his hesitancy to leave a
situation where his scientific work was proceeding well
and where many highly qualified investigators had come to
work with him (Nachmansohn,

1979; Niewyk,

1980).

His

choice to remain at the Institute was heralded by the
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Kaiser Wilhelm Society's President as being most
fortuitous

(Beyerchen, 1977).

After the decision had been made to remain in
Germany and to endure the difficulties incumbent in such
a determination, Meyerhof used his position to implement
several strategies that were in direct opposition to the
restrictions upon intellectual liberty established by the
Civil Service Law.

In so doing, he was able to ensure

the continuation of the careers of many of his Jewish
colleagues

(Beyerchen, 1977; Nachmansohn,

1979).

Initially, as Director of a Kaiser Wilhelm
Institute, Meyerhof wrote a letter to Frederick Glum, the
acting President of the Society,

to remind the officer of

the "moral duty one had to employees who had served the
Society for many years"

(Macrakis,

1993, 54).

He

emphasized that the Society and its membership could not
change the law; but, he also stressed--to no avail--that
the utmost should be done to "modify the brutality in the
ruthless application of the law"

(1993, 55).

Another strategy of Meyerhof's was to use the semiprivate status of the Kaiser Wilhelm Society as a means
of protecting as many professors from dismissal as
possible.

Since the Civil Service Law's "cleansing

policy" applied only to those institutions that received
more than 50% of their funding from the government,

the
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Nazis' did not have total control over his Institute.
Realizing that he was funded from both state and private
monies, with the larger portion coming from private
sources, Meyerhof was able to maneuver around the
dismissal policy on behalf of his "non-Aryan" professors.
By using the Institute's semi-private funding statue,
Meyerhof helped to maintain its academic freedom during
the difficult years from 1933 through 1938
Borden,

1983; Macrakis,

(Jackman and

1993).

The National Socialist Party, in its move to control
all education, had violated the academic principle of
Lehrfreiheit by requiring professors to propagate the
Nazi Party agenda.

Faculty who had received university

positions were required to participate in political
training so that they could indoctrinate their university
students with National Socialist ideology.
professors in those positions were,

Since

in actuality,

training the youth in the tenets of Nazi policy, Party
officials were generally very inquisitive as to their
racial backgrounds.

However, Meyerhof's professors and

their students, due to the semi-private status of the
Institute, were far enough removed from the educational
main-stream that they were able to avoid such regulations
and the inevitable scrutiny that came with them
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(Bentwich, 1953; Beyerchen,

1977; Kevles, 1978; Macrakis,

1993) .
In addition, Meyerhof labored with the Society to
increase the monetary support of Germany's
industrialists.

This enabled the Institute of Physiology

to ensure that financial concerns would not cause them to
have to relinquish their non-government status and their
control over their right to academic self-governance.
Meyerhof worked to elect presidents of the Society from
among the leaders of industry rather than only from the
fields of science.

The selection of these individuals as

Society presidents was a skillful diplomatic move
(Niewyk, 1980; Macrakis, 1993).
Any connection with industry served to improve
relations with the National Socialists, since the Nazi's
needed whatever help they could get from the industrial
sector to assist their build-up of war technology.

If

the industrialists were supportive of the Kaiser Wilhelm
Society's Institutes,

the likelihood of Nazi interference

with those Institutes was decreased (Fleming and Bailyn,
1969; Beyerchen,

1977).

The benefits of this industrial connection also
extended to the facilitation of Meyerhof's attempts to
fill the professorial positions vacated as a result of
the dismissal policy of the Civil Service Law.

Since the
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Nazi's wanted to maintain good relations with the
industrialists who supported the work done by the
Society, Meyerhof's candidates for faculty posts were
generally accepted by the Nazi Ministry of Education.
The ability to formulate and to execute such positive
strategies accounted in large part for Meyerhof's and his
Institute's relatively undisturbed survival in the
advance of Hitler's anti-semitic juggernaught

(Beyechen,

1977; Kevles, 1978; Nachmansohn, 1979) .
As Meyerhof worked to maintain both his position of
influence and his research, his efforts on behalf of his
colleagues could only be categorized as unusual.

He had

been born into a well-established upper middle-class
family and had been totally absorbed in his youth with
philosophy, art, and science.

After a serious illness,

he had been sent to Egypt for four months to recover.
During this period of forced seclusion, Meyerhof went
through a philosophical and artistic metamorphosis.
result,

The

for Meyerhof in his later years, was a more

humane approach to both the science of medicine and to
its practitioners.

His colleagues were co-discoverers

not just co-workers; therefore, his "moral duty"
(Macrakis, 1993, 54) to them extended beyond the academic
realm.

His humane approach, contrasted against the

backdrop of the inhumanity of Nazi politics, motivated
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him to continue to work in Germany and to ensure, as long
as he could, the safety of his colleagues

(Bentwich,

1953; Nachmansohn, 1979; 1993).
Despite the implementation of his strategies to
remain in Germany and to assist others to do the same,
Meyerhof's campaign eventually was overwhelmed by the
determination of the Nazi Party to press its agenda upon
every segment of German society.

In addition, by the

middle 1930s the Reichstag gave the Ministry of Education
in Berlin the authority to classify any instances of
"non-conformity" to Nazi policy as treasonous
1986) .

In other words,

(Gallin,

if the political ideology of a

professor did not align with the ideals of the Third
Reich, both he and his research were judged as "nonconforming" and thereby "un-German"
1979).

(1986; Nachmansohn,

Once again, the government increased its control

over the minds of the professoriate.

To think,

speak, or

publish anything contrary to the Nazi agenda was deemed
an act of treason.

The National Socialists determined

that they had the right to dominate all expressions of
the truth that were necessary for the maintenance of the
people's liberty (Macrakis, 1993).
Increasingly, Meyerhof found himself in the
situation of choosing between exile or capitulation.
According to William Dodd, the United States Ambassador
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to Germany at that time,

"The universities have been

deprived of the place they once held as centers of German
intellectual life....all the disciplines within the
university had suffered because nothing could be taught
that conflicted with the 'Nazi faith'"
100).

(Weinberg, 1986,

Meyerhof eventually had to acknowledge to himself

and to others that his "position had become untenable"
(Macrakis, 1993, 65) and that he would, therefore, have
to leave Germany.

Otto Stern in Germany
On the day that Adolph Hitler became Chancellor of
Germany, January 30, 1933, Otto Stern informed his
colleagues at the University of Hamburg that he was going
to resign from his position as professor of physical
chemistry.

Temporarily dissuaded by the pleas of his

colleagues, Stern agreed to delay his decision.

However,

he stressed to them that, at the first hint of any
attempt by the Nazi's to interfere with the personnel in
his department, he would indeed leave.

Stern had seen,

over the past two decades, the anti-semitism that was
growing within the German state.

He realized that, with

the rise of the Nazi Party to power,

the future of Jewish

scientists within academia would grow increasingly
uncertain.

Within weeks of the National Socialists
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having passed the Civil Service Laws in April, 1933, the
impact of the new dismissal policy was felt in Stern's
department.

In June of that same year, Stern walked out

of his laboratory, never to return (Farber, 1953; Clark,
1984; Weber, 1980).
Otto Stern's early academic career had greatly
benefitted by his birth into a prosperous Jewish family,
which desired that their children satisfy their thirst
for knowledge by traveling and exploring several fields
before deciding on a career.

Although his studies at the

Gymnasium emphasized the Classics, Stern's private
readings lead him to further explore several areas of
science and mathematics.

When the time came for him to

follow his interests at the university level, the
financial support from his family provided the means for
him to migrate from university to university.

He was

able to attend lectures on a variety of subjects without
regard to curricula or the time needed for completion of
promotion requirements.

Stern experienced the classic

expression of Lernfreiheit throughout his years as a
university student {Heathcote, 1953; Grunberger, 1971;
Beyerchen, 1977).
During this time of independent academic pursuit, he
attended lectures on both theoretical and experimental
physics, which gave him the foundation for his later
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decision to pursue a career in theoretical science.
After he received his Ph.D. in 1912, his decision to work
in theoretical physics brought him into contact with
Albert Einstein.

He became one of Einstein's po s t 

doctoral associates both at the German University in
Prague,

from 1911-1912, and then at the

Hochschule in Zurich, from 1912-1914

Technische

(Kevles, 1978;

Weber, 1980; Schlessinger and Schlessinger, 1986;
Macrakis, 1993).
Subsequent to his work with Einstein and his
teaching positions at the Universities of Frankfurt and
Rostock,

Stern accepted a chair as professor of physical

chemistry in 1923 at the University of Hamburg, where he
immediately was given the opportunity to establish a
molecular beam research laboratory.

Stern had finally

been given an opportunity both to teach and to do the
research that he had, for over a decade, wanted to begin
(Heathcote, 1953; Fleming and Bailyn, 1969; Proctor,
1988) .
Although Stern had chosen the field of theoretical
physics primarily because of his intense interest in the
subject,

there was another reason for his selection--the

limited opportunity to choose other academic areas in
which to work.

The anti-semitic prejudice that began to

develop among the German professoriate during the years

120
of the Weimar Republic indirectly caused many talented
young researchers to move into physics rather than into
other areas of science.

In general, the non-Jewish

German professoriate did not insist upon a Jewish
student's right to choose the field in which he studied.
Usually,

the professors in the more established

disciplines,

that is, chemistry, were unwilling to take

on Jewish students.

They did, however, not prevent them

from moving into those areas where Jews had already
established themselves
Nachmansohn,

(Bentwich, 1953; Beyerchen,

1977;

1979; Niewyk, 1980).

Although access to the broad spectrum of academia
was not "encouraged" for Jewish students, one area in
which Jewish scholars were tolerated, was physics.

Their

relatively high concentration in physics departments
later proved to be a disadvantage for Jewish professors,
for it made them perfect targets for Nazi attacks against
their intellectual freedom (Bentwich,
1979; Niewyk,

1953; Nachmansohn,

1980).

As mentioned previously, two German scientists who
were quite open in their racist attitudes toward Jewish
professors were Philipp Lenard and Johannes Stark.
Lenard had written a text book whose introduction came to
serve as the battle cry for "German" physicists:
"'German physics?'

People will ask.

I could have also
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said Aryan physics or physics of Nordic natured persons,
physics of the reality-founders, of the truth-seekers,
physics of those who have founded natural research"
(Beyerchen,

1977, 125).

Stark's writings repeatedly attacked the reliability
of Jewish physics from the perspective that a
researcher's racial heritage affected the conclusion he
would draw from his work (Weinberg, 1986).

The

assumption that being a Jew meant that one's findings
would automatically have a Jewish limitation to it called
into question the integrity of Jewish professors and
assumed that their scientific endeavors were not geared
toward pursuing the truth, but toward presenting Jewish
propaganda (Beyerchen, 1977).
Such protracted philosophical attacks lay at the
root of Stern's initial response to Hitler's move into
power.

He knew that the imposition of anti-semitic

policies would probably increase.

When the Civil Service

Laws were passed, although Stern was exempted from
dismissal due to his service in the German Army during
World War I, he could foresee the inevitability of the
corruption of intellectual life that would follow
(Kevles, 1978; Gordon,

1984; Proctor,

1988).

The seriousness of the situation for "Jewish"
scientists that had developed between the April passage
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of the Civil Service Laws and Stern's June resignation is
confirmed by the contents of a letter written on June 19,
1933 by the American mathematician, John von Neumann, to
Princeton mathematician, Oswald Veblen.

Relative to his

recent visit to Germany, von Neumann wrote that:
Germany....was very depressing.

We have been three

days in Gottingen and the rest in Berlin, and had
time to see and appreciate the effects of the
present German madness.
Gottingen,

in the first place,

that if these boys
more years

It is simply horrible.

In

it is quite obvious

[Nazis] continue for only two

(which is unfortunately very probable),

they will ruin German science for a generation--at
least

(Fleming and Bailyn,

1969, 205).

Stern's recognition that anti-semitism would
increase under the Nazi regime was confirmed when the
Nazi Party demanded that he dismiss his Jewish
colleagues.

With this, Stern realized that his own

professional demise was not far away.

These realities

led him to resign from his professorial chair as he
recognized the historical pattern of violation of the
academic freedom of the German Jewish professoriate.
German science no longer held a place for him.
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The Opportunities in America
An article in the November 7, 1938 issue of
Newsweek, opened with the following line:
States now leads the world in science."

"The United
The statement

declared that the accumulation in America over the
previous two decades of superior intellects represented
in its scientific community had surpassed all other
nations

(Kevles, 1978).

In support of this claim, several accomplishments
could be enumerated.

American graduate schools were

offering first-rate training in both the fundamentals and
the frontiers of scientific thought.

Students no longer

felt compelled to travel abroad to find high levels of
intense and sophisticated research.

Throughout the

country several well-appointed laboratories had superior
professorial staffs running them.

Scientific journals

from the United States were filled with ground-breaking
articles and their publication was awaited with
anticipation throughout the world (Kevles, 1978; Perry,
1984) .
America owed no little debt for this new-found fame
within the global scientific community to the numerous
European immigrants who had come to this country since
1933

(Fermi, 1987).

Once absorbed into America's system

of colleges and universities,

these refugees enriched
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science departments with their "mathematical techniques,
their experimental imagination, and their sophisticated
philosophical approach to the analysis of natural
phenomena"

(Kevles, 1978, 282).

On the surface, a fertile academic environment
replete with world-renowned immigrant scientists was
functioning within the "picture-perfect" atmosphere of a
spirit of cooperation.

Underneath the surface, however,

the American scene was characterized by some shortcomings
that have historically been part of the journey
undertaken by those "yearning to breathe free"
1987).

(Fermi,

In the case of the emigrating intellectuals

during the 1930s, three particular adverse situations
confronted them:

the Great Depression, communism, and

anti-semitism (Fleming and Bailyn,
Clark,

1969; Kevles,

1978;

1984).

The Great Depression
In June, 1933, Alvin Johnson, head of the New School
for Social Research, estimated that 5,000 Ph.D. graduates
from American universities were unemployed in the United
States.

The Great Depression had hit the academic

community hard and its impact was especially felt by
these newest entrants.

In the face of too many

academically qualified individuals chasing too few
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professorial and research positions, foreign immigrant
professors appeared as "unfair" competition.

On the

other hand, college and university administrators could
not ignore the highly qualified senior immigrant
professors who were knocking on their doors.

Such being

the case, a university often risked criticism when it
bypassed American candidates for positions and instead
selected foreign researchers

(Fermi, 1987; Perry,

1984;

Weinberg, 1986).
Realistically,
around.

there was not enough money to go

The Depression had caused government financial

support for research to begin to plummet.

During the

early 1930s, Congressional economizers had slashed the
budgets of federal research projects an average of twelve
and one-half percent.

These projects, even after their

appropriations had passed by their appropriate
committees, still barely made it through debate on the
floor of Congress,

By 1933, federal support for

education had fallen as much as twenty-six percent from
pre-depression levels

(Fleming, 1980; Perry, 1984)

University budgets were also being cut considerably
by state legislatures as well as by governors who often
required more reductions before approving them.

Private

capital funds also collapsed and some endowments for
research, such as those at Cornell, were completely
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devastated.

The annual income of the endowed Carnegie

Institution of Washington fell by over $1 million.
Washington University in St. Louis had so little money
that it was unable to complete the third story of its
physics building; instead, that floor was converted into
a children's skating rink.

The reduction in financial

support faced by American colleges and universities from
both their public and private benefactors meant that
fewer professorial positions awaited an increasing number
of applicants, both foreign and domestic

(Kevles, 1978;

Perry, 1984).
To further complicate matters,

the public had grown

discontented with the wonders of the new technology of
the "machine civilization"
Unfortunately,

(Kevles, 1978, 257).

technology was often blamed for high

levels of unemployment.

Americans began wondering if

science had produced more than consumers could absorb and
if machines were destroying more jobs than they could
create.

The resulting lack of public enthusiasm for the

funding of scientific endeavors further narrowed the
number of and entrance to new academic positions
and Bailyn, 1969; 1978; Weinberg,

(Fleming

1986).

This lack of popular support for funding new
university positions was also due in part to citizen
concern for their own financial security.

As William
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Green, the President of the American Federation of Labor,
had pointed out, the cast-offs of technology had been
able previously to find work in n ew industries.

However,

the economic climate of the early 1930s offered no new
industries for these newly unemployed (Clark, 1984;.
Perry, 1984).

President Hoover's Committee on Recent

Social Trends even reported that,
speeding up of social invention,

"Unless there is a
or a slowing down of

mechanical invention, grave maladjustments are certain to
result"

(Kevles, 1978, 237).

This mood and reality of

tight money and native-born American self-preservation
often set scholar against scholar and layman against
intellectual.

The environment was perfect for an

intensification of American xenophobia.

Communism
As America entered World War I, patriotism was
often focused in the direction of Theodore Roosevelt's
slogan,

"America for Americans"

(Fermi, 1987, 21).

In an

effort to promote this concept of "100% Americanism"
(1987, 21), patriotic crusaders sometimes even went into
minority neighborhoods to encourage Americanization of
the foreign-born.

Such well-meaning efforts faded,

however, when German agents committed the first acts of
sabotage in the United States during World War I.
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Instead, these incidents inevitably led to a campaign
against German-born "hyphenated Americans" whose loyalty
to America was now presumed to be divided (1987; Kevles,
1978) .
The schism, which continued throughout the war,
intensified at its end.

Post-war America experienced a

new surge of patriotic nationalism,

due to its victory in

World War I and its elevation into a position of
international prominence.

Nationalism bolstered the idea

that admitting aliens was an unwarranted hazard to
national welfare

(Fermi, 1987; Clark, 1984).

This

foundation of fear was strengthened during the 1920s and
early 1930s by the furor over communism.
The American Communist Party of the 1920s was
composed primarily of immigrants who had come to America
during the previous twenty years.

Nine out of every ten

Communist Party members was an immigrant.
foreign membership,

Of this

the second largest group was made up

of individuals of Jewish origin.

Of the nearly 16,000

members of the Party in 1925, over 1,400 were Jews who
spoke as their native tongue the Yiddish dialect.
However, within the other foreign-language sections of
the Party, such as the Polish, Rumanian, Russian,
Lithuanian, Hungarian, etc., there were also individuals
of Jewish heritage.

Consequently, the American Communist
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Party was viewed as having a heavy Jewish influence
(Glaser,

1978).

Such figures did not reflect the political views of
most Jews in America since, at the Communist Party's
height in the middle 1930s, its membership only briefly
rose above 50,000 at a time when there were over
4,500,000 Jews in America.

However, these raid-1920

figures were enough to create fear among the American
populace that the ideals of the American dream were being
supplanted by foreign-born "non-Americans"
"Red Scare"

(Klehr, 1984).

(Fermi, 1987) hysteria began to sweep

through the United States.

The idea that American

capitalism could be replaced with European communism and
that these new immigrants should have the opportunity to
enjoy what natural-born Americans had worked so hard to
establish brought fear into the heart of the "average"
American.

This double-edged political and economic sword

struck deep into those whose idea of nationalism excluded
foreigners and whose xenophobic fears primarily focused
on the Jew

(1987).

The blame for the influx of communism into the
American dream on those who were not "truly" American
made communism appear to be an entirely foreign import.
In order for "loyal" Americans to prevent its spread, it
was logical for them to curb the access its perpetrators
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had to American society.

Although intellectuals as a

whole were unwilling to take the final step of actually
becoming communists,

their liberal stance was viewed by

some Americans as sufficient confirmation of their
commitment to universal communism.

Such stereotypic

inferences served to widen the gap between immigrants and
those university positions that were supposedly to be
filled only by "patriotic" Americans
1984; Weinberg,

{Fermi, 1987; Perry,

1986; Klehr and Haynes,

1992).

Anti-Semitism
Just as the "Red Scare" limited immigrants in their
attempts to assimilate into American society, a parallel
mass hysteria, the "Jewish Scare" during the 1920s and
1930s

(Weinberg, 1986), isolated the Jewish segment

within the immigrant population, making their integration
into American culture quite difficult.

The anti-semitism

of the "Jewish Scare" was greatly aggravated by the
actions of multi-millionaire industrialist, Henry Ford.
During the 1930s, The Dearborn Independent. Ford's weekly
newspaper, with a circulation of over 250,000, printed
exposes of alleged Jewish evils in ninety-one consecutive
weekly issues.

He then reprinted excerpts of this series

in a four-volume pamphlet entitled,

"The International

Jew" and had it translated into sixteen different

131
languages so that his anti-semitic message was even more
widely circulated (Fleming and Bailyn, 1969; 1986).

The

blatant use of the Jew as a scapegoat for the social ills
of the era by such an influential individual served to
further exacerbate the anti-Jewish feeling in America.
During the decades of the 1920s and 1930s, the Ku
Klux Klan also pushed to make "the Jew" a national issue.
With chapters at such universities as Harvard, Yale, and
Syracuse as well as in many mid-western and southern
towns, the Klan was able to spread its anti-semitic
propaganda across the various social strata in America.
It was not uncommon for the Klan to "frequently,

[in]

Friday evening automobile caravans, pass synagogues,
shouting insults from behind their white hoods"
(Weinberg, 1986, 214) .

With such forces at work, anti

semitism gradually became institutionalized in American
society (Franklin, 1981; 1986).
As historian, Stanley Feldstein

(1978) wrote in his

survey of three centuries of Jewish history:
During these decades, employment agencies openly
advertised that 'No Jews need apply;' quota systems
were adopted by universities, membership in social
and professional organizations was limited to
'Christians only,' and 'gentlemen's agreements' were
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reached to keep the 'sheenies' out of the 'better'
residential neighborhoods

(1978, 283).

in such a hostile environment, American higher
education was largely closed to Jewish candidates for
faculty positions.

By the middle 1920s, less than 100

Jews could be counted among the university professoriate
of liberal arts and science faculties in the United
States.

In 1930, Washington Square College of New York

University, which enrolled the largest Jewish student
body in the world, employed no Jewish professors.

Not

that there was a lack of Jewish candidates for
professorial positions; rather, the paucity was due to
prejudice and discrimination.

Highly qualified Jewish

applicants were often placed on waiting lists, where they
"waited" endlessly (Fleming and Bailyn, 1969; Clark,
1984; Fermi, 1987) .

Obviously, certain university

faculties and administrations were unwilling to stand
against the prejudices of their times.
In one respect, American anti-semitism differed from
the European variety.

The limitations it imposed upon

Jews were not necessarily inflicted by the state; rather,
it was the "'private governments'

-- industry and trade,

banks and insurance companies, real estate boards and
neighborhood associations, clubs and societies, colleges"
that erected walls to keep Jews out (McWilliams, 1948,
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147-148).

it was this America, filled both with

opportunities and prejudices that greeted the four elite
scientists upon their arrival from Germany.

Once again,

they had to struggle to find their response.

Albert Einstein in America
"Wouldn't it be funny if they won't let me in?

Why,

the whole world would laugh at America," responded
Einstein to a newspaper reporter's questions about the
conversation he had had during the course of applying for
his visa to the United States at the American Consulate
in Berlin in December 1932
Messersmith,

(Sayen, 1985, 7).

George

the American Consul, was out of Berlin when

Einstein came to the get his visa.

Problems had begun to

develop when Einstein, who was normally spared having to
answer the series of questions typically asked of
individuals applying for visas, was questioned by Raymond
B. Geist, assistant to the American Consul

(Fermi, 1987;

1985).
Mr. Geist asked numerous questions ranging from
queries about Einstein's political affiliations to
inquiries about the purpose for his visit to the United
States.

Finally, the weary Einstein exploded at the

assistant with the statement,

"What's this, an
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inquisition?

Is this an attempt at chicanery?"

{Sayen,

1985, 7).
Einstein was quick to inform Mr. Geist that he had
not asked to go to America; but, had been begged to visit
the country by American scientists.

He went on to say

that, if he was to be considered a "suspect," he would
prefer to cancel his trip.

Einstein then demanded that

his visa be issued by noon the following day or he would
remain in Berlin.

By that afternoon,

the press had

picked up the story and the American Consulate became the
target of international ridicule.

Einstein got his visa

(French, 1979; Clark, 1984; Sayen,

1985).

This event had followed an even more explosive
situation that had begun to develop a month earlier.
Einstein had been invited to spend a third consecutive
winter-term at the California Institute of Technology.
When Mrs. Randolph Frothingham, President of the Woman
Patriotic Corporation, heard of the invitation, she
submitted a sixteen-page brief to the State Department.
The legal brief on behalf of the Corporation requested
that Einstein be barred from entering America
and Bailyn,

1969; Clark,

(Fleming

1984).

The Corporation claimed that Einstein was the leader
of an "anarcho-communist program to shatter the military
machinery" of the existing government as a "preliminary
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condition" for a world-wide people's revolution (Sayen,
1985, 6).

Recognizing that Einstein's scientific and

religious views could not prevent his entry, the brief
charged that he had
promoted lawless confusion to shatter the Church as
well as the State--and to leave, if possible, even
the laws of nature and the principles of science in
confusion and disorder and subject to revision with
every new proclamation of an Einstein Theory1

His

frequently revised theory of relativity is of no
more practical importance than the answer to the old
academic riddle,

"How many angels can stand on the

point of a needle if angels do not occupy space"
(1985, 6) .
Even though these events had occurred a few months
prior to Hitler's official acceptance of the position as
Chancellor of Germany, they represented the difficulties
experienced by Einstein in his attempts to enter the
United States.

Although Einstein was an international

figure, whose scientific value to mankind had many times
been heralded,
touched him.

the impact of American xenophobia still
After renouncing his German citizenship and

spending a short time in England lecturing, Einstein
sailed to America to become the first professor of the
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Institute of Advanced Study in Princeton, New Jersey
(Kevles, 1978; French,

1979).

Upon his arrival, a pattern of challenges to
Einstein's academic freedom emerged due to Abraham
Flexner's autocratic control over the Institute of
Advanced Study.

Flexner, Einstein's academic recruiter

and the Institute's Director, began to infringe upon
Einstein's academic freedom by taking control of his
personal appointments.

Flexner repeatedly rejected

outside invitations for the scientist using the excuse
that such interruptions would not be conducive to
advancing his research.

Initially, this control did not

appear to bother Einstein, in that he was a reserved
individual who enjoyed his solitude

(Dukas and Hoffmann,

1979; Sayen, 1985).
Flexner also discouraged Einstein from becoming
involved with Jewish activities.

When Einstein had

played his violin at a Jewish benefit, and his picture
had appeared in the New York Times. Flexner voiced
concern that Einstein's attendance at such activities
would fan the flames of anti-semitism.
feared potential adverse publicity.

Perhaps, Flexner

The Institute's

survival depended upon the generosity of donors whose
views on Zionism and politics did not necessarily
coincide with those of Einstein.

From this and other
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similar incidents,

it slowly became obvious that extra

mural utterances by Einstein were perceived by Flexner as
being detrimental to the new Institute

(Fleming and

Bailyn, 1969; Fermi, 1987).
Flexner also had rejected an invitation to Dr. and
Mrs. Einstein from President and Mrs. Roosevelt for
dinner at the White House, using the same excuse of
research privacy without exception.
Flexner's response,

Upon hearing of

Einstein wrote a letter to Mrs.

Roosevelt expressing his sincere regret for this action.
He wrote,

"You can hardly imagine of what great interest

it would have been for me to meet the man who is tackling
with gigantic energy the greatest and most difficult
problem of our time"

(Sayen, 1985, 66) .

Upon receipt of

Einstein's letter, Mrs. Roosevelt immediately extended a
second invitation, which the Einstein's accepted (Clark,
1984; 1985) .
As a result of such incidents, Einstein grew furious
with Flexner.

His irritation was expressed once in a

return address on a letter to Rabbi Wise,
Camp,

Princeton"

(Sayen, 1985, 66).

"Concentration

Einstein,

in a long

letter to the Board of Trustees of the Institute,
complained about Flexner's interference in his private
affairs and threatened to resign if Flexner did not leave
him alone.

Flexner immediately terminated his daily
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admonitions and memos.

His next correspondence to

Einstein was dated several years later (Clark, 1984;
Sayen,

1985).

By the mid-1930s, Flexner's poor interpersonal
relations extended beyond merely Einstein.

The rest of

the faculty felt that they had a right to participate in
daily and future policy and decision-making in the
Institute.
Trustees

They requested representation on the Board of

(Clark, 1984; Sayen, 1985; Dukas and Hoffmann,

1979).
Over the next several years, relations between the
Director and the faculty continued to worsen.

Finally,

in November 1932, after no improvement, Einstein
addressed a letter to his close friend Samuel Leidesdorf,
Treasurer of the Institute's Board of Trustees.

He

shared his fear that a growing number of issues involving
the Institute could jeopardize its autonomy and
development.

Einstein's main concern was the growing

influence that Princeton University was having over the
Institute's internal affairs.

It had been said, at a

faculty meeting at the Institute, that "A young
mathematician was denied admission...in a discrete
manner, because his being 'colored' would have caused
problems with Princeton University"

(Sayen, 1985, 92).

Flexner, at the meeting, had not questioned the facts,
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but denied knowledge of the incident
French,

(Kevles, 1978;

1979; 1985).

Einstein and many of his Institute colleagues did
question the incident as well as Flexner's knowledge of
it.

They also wondered whether other undesirables,

as Jews, might be excluded from admission.

such

By way of

substantiating their concern, Einstein pointed out that
he had learned that a high ranking administrator at the
University had told a group of friends that "there are
too many Jews

[at the Institute]" (Sayen, 1985, 92).

Einstein was alarmed by the direct attack upon ethnicity
that was being carried out by the Institute and the
University.

Their actions amounted to a denigration of

the essence of intellectual freedom (Fleming and Bailyn,
1969; French, 1979; 1985)
Einstein was also concerned that, with Flexner
nearing retirement, a change in the Directorship of the
Institute would soon occur.

He feared that, due to

Flexner's autocratic managerial tendencies, a new
appointment would be made without any faculty
participation.

Such an unilateral decision would have

been inconsistent with making the Institute a place where
each faculty member shared in the governance process.
Einstein was also concerned that the Board of Trustees
would be sacrificing their authority.

This decision
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making process might be so subtle that the Trustees would
be unaware of the interference

(Dukas and Hoffmann,

1979;

Clark, 1984; Sayen, 1985).
Once again, in December, 1937, Einstein addressed a
letter to Leidesdorf.

In this correspondence, he charged

that the faculty still did not have a true voice in the
affairs of the Institute.

Although Flexner had finally

recommended two faculty members to serve on the Board,
Einstein and the other professors did not feel that they
represented the faculty.
professorial consultation.

They had been chosen without
He also questioned why none

of those appointed were Jewish
Clark, 1984; Sayen,

(Dukas and Hoffmann, 1979;

1985).

Einstein suggested the only possible solution was
for faculty to choose their own representatives and to
invest them with the formal authority to represent their
views to the Board.

He concluded the letter by asking

Leidesdorf to initiate appropriate action with the Board.
He received no reply to his letter and apparently no
action was taken.

Once again, the request for Institute

policy to be supportive of faculty self-government was
ignored, this time at the highest level of policy-making
(Fermi, 1987; Kevles,
in 1938,
an uproar.

1978; Sayen, 1985).

the faculty of the Institute was again in

Flexner appointed two faculty members in his
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new School of Economics and Politics without consulting
two of the three sitting professors.

Neither appointee

was a distinguished scholar, neither was an experienced
teacher, and neither had a Ph.D.

The faculty felt that

neither man was qualified to teach at a graduate school.
Nevertheless, Flexner ha d employed them at the maximum
salary.

Einstein and the other faculty members felt that

it was essential for the selection of new faculty members
to involve peer evaluation and consent.

For the contrary

to occur was counter productive to the maintenance of
high academic standards for teaching (Kevles, 1978;
Clark, 1984; Sayen, 1985)
Finally, in response to these repeated violations of
academic freedom,

the faculty passed, in March, 1939, a

formal resolution asking Flexner to bring before the
Trustees their request to be consulted on the appointment
of the Director.

The persistence of the faculty over the

next several months relative to this issue forced Flexner
to admit,

in early August, that he could no longer co

exist with his faculty.
effective October 9, 1939
Hoffmann,

He tendered his resignation
(Fermi, 1987; Dukas and

1979; Clark, 1984).

The Institute's new Director, Frank Aydelotte,
exerted a calming influence through his willingness both
to recognize the faculty's role in the governance of the
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Institute and to acknowledge their autonomy.

He even

moved his office so that, as Director, he was no longer
isolated from the other scholars in the Institute.

This

daily contact proved to be immensely helpful in ensuring
a unified approach to issues of concern to the Institute
(French, 1979; Clark, 1984).
Although Einstein loathed faculty politics and
harbored no personal ambitions, when the issue was the
question of academic freedom, he was willing, as always,
to be a leading figure in the conflict.

Through his

actions and those of his colleagues, a greater level of
academic freedom was experienced, especially under Dr.
Aydelotte's leadership.
little,

Where there had once been

if any, professorial representation on the Board,

there was now a clear understanding of the need for
faculty to assist in governing the Institute.
Additionally, the place of the faculty in the evaluation
of candidates for academic positions was secured.
Finally/

the freedom of association and expression

outside the Institute's walls had been firmly
established.

James Franck in America
Immediately after leaving Germany, Franck accepted a
one-year professorship at the University of Copenhagen in
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Denmark.

Upon fulfilling this commitment, he arrived in

America in 1935 to take a position as professor of
physical chemistry at Johns Hopkins University.

Although

Franck had planned to remain at this position, he left
after only three years.

The unrelenting anti-semitic

attitude displayed toward the Jewish members of the
faculty by the University's President, Isaiah Bowman, was
apparently the primary impetus.

Franck, having left a

country in which his academic freedom had been curtailed
by government policy, now found himself attached to a
university where he was restricted by a president who was
allowed to give full sway to his racist sentiments
(Duggan and Drury, 1948; Fleming and Bailyn,
Kevles,

1978; Jackman and Borden,

1969;

1983).

The anti-semitic behavior of Bowman was particularly
strange in light of his decision, only one year later, to
sign a Rockefeller Foundation sponsored report entitled,
"Proposed Program for Joint Action by the American
Universities to Provide an Asylum for Those Refugees from
European Countries Who Are Distinguished Members of the
International Community of Scholars--Declaration of
Principles"

(Duggan and Drury, 1948).

This document had

been formulated with the intent of securing the
cooperation and financial donations of wealthy Jews in
order to assist immigrant Jewish professors in the United
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States.

Bowman and the other signers expected that these

financial benefactors would more readily endow
foundations and grants for the employment of immigrant
Jewish professors if the university administrators
seeking such support had pledged to encourage and promote
potential Jewish faculty members
Schlessinger and Schlessinger,

(Duggan and Drury,

1948;

1986).

The text of the report Included various references
to the immigrant professors and their plight:
The American universities and colleges further
recognize the importance of taking some joint action
to assist the members of the academic world who are
today suffering through no fault of their own and
who have been deprived of their opportunity of
contributing to the advancement of knowledge.

This

action is to be undertaken...to further that ancient
university tradition which recognized no racial or
national barriers to free inquiry or the promotion
of sound learning.

It is the belief of the

undersigned administrative heads of the American
universities and colleges that in making
appointments to the staff, merit alone should be
considered (Duggan and Drury, 1948, 99).
In affixing their names to this report,

individuals

pledged the cooperation of their organizations and their
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institutions of higher education not to focus upon race,
but, instead to lean upon an individual's merit.

The

report was designed to foster, beginning at the
organizational level, the continued growth of an
atmosphere of professorial intellectual liberty

(1948).

The document was signed by the officers of the
Association of American Universities,
State Universities,
Universities,

the Association of

the Association of Urban

the Association of American Colleges, and

college and university presidents whose names would be
influential.

Appearing among the signatures of these

individuals were those of twelve university president's,
including Conant of Harvard, Wriston of Brown, Day of
Cornell, Gates of the University of Pennsylvania, Dodds
of Princeton, and Seymour of Yale.

Also in this list of

prestigious educators was the name of Isaiah Bowman,
President of Johns Hopkins University (Duggan and Drury,
1948).
In the report,

the university presidents pledged to

support all Jewish immigrant professors.

Dr. Bowman's

support of this document contrasts with an administrative
style whose anti-semitic inclination accounted for
Franck's willingness to leave his position at Johns
Hopkins in order to seek a post elsewhere.

In this

instance, academic policy did not match academic reality
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(Duggan and Drury, 1948; Fermi, 1987; Jackman and Borden,
1983) .
At the same time, Robert M. Hutchins, Chancellor of
the University of Chicago, realized that the dismissals
occurring in German universities offered him an
unprecedented opportunity to enrich his faculty with
superior professors

(Kevles, 1978; Fermi, 1987).

By

extending invitations to exiled intellectuals to teach at
the University of Chicago, he was able to "come out
strongly for academic freedom and at the same time
enlarge his staff with the most eminent men in Europe"
(1987, 72).

The exodus from German academia had resulted

in an influx of disenfranchised, yet highly qualified
professors into America.

The idea of a professor's

freedom to exercise his academic rights resulted in
benefits both for the American university as well as for
the immigrant professoriate

(1978; 1987).

The college and university presidents involved
consulted each other, exchanged copies of letters from
Europe requesting positions, and feverishly sought
wealthy individuals and foundations to find financial
backing

(Fermi, 1987).

Hutchins wanted the University of

Chicago to "bring at least four distinguished German
scholars to the university for no less than three years"
(1987, 72).
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Hutchins wrote to a prominent attorney expressing
his need for someone to underwrite a new professorial
chair in the physics department.

After securing the

endowment, Hutchins extended an invitation to James
Franck to accept a position at the University of Chicago,
in 1938.

Franck accepted the position of professor of

physical chemistry and continued his work through a
research grant extended to the university by the Samuel
Fels Foundation.

Franck retained his professorship at

the University of Chicago until 1947, when he retired as
an emeritus

(Fleming and Bailyn,

1969; Schlessinger and

Schlessinger, 1986).
In spite of the shoddy way in which he was initially
treated, Franck did not appear to be disillusioned about
his life in his newly adopted homeland.

He continued to

believe that "while democracy might not be the perfect
form of government and society, it was the best"

(Kevles,

1978, 282).

Otto Meyerhof in America
When Meyerhof left Germany in 1938, he came directly
to America in hopes of finding a professorial position at
a university.

However, by this time, the attitude in the

United States toward immigrant Jewish professors had
worsened.

This attitude was reflected in the lack of
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opportunities that Meyerhof had during his academic
career in America.

With the first Diaspora of Jewish

intellectuals in the early 1930s, Americans were somewhat
in sympathy with the needs of immigrant Jewish scientists
because of the sudden persecutions of the Nazi regime.
By the latter part of the 1930s, however,

the realities

of the Depression and of the resultant focus upon selfpreservation along with the anti-semitism inherent in the
social concerns of the period had begun to make some
Americans willing to limit the freedoms of the Jews
(Fermi, 1987; Duggan and Drury, 1948).
Twice in 1938, national polls included the
question,

"Do you think the persecution of the Jews in

Europe had been their own fault?"

In both March and May

of that year, an average of eleven percent of the
respondents said that it was entirely the Jews fault;
forty-nine percent stated that, in their opinion,

the

persecution of the Jews in Europe was partly their fault.
Such findings indicated that a majority of Americans
believed that the Jews in Europe "had it coming to them"
(Weinberg, 1986, 220).
Additionally,

the same March poll also asked,

"Do

you think Jews have too much power in the United States?"
Forty-one percent of the respondents answered yes.
Similarly, high percentages of the populace thought that
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Jews were "greedy, dishonest, and overly aggressive"
(Weinberg, 1986, 220).

Seven percent of the respondents

even said that they would support an American campaign
against the Jews

(1986, 221).

With such a large

percentage of the American population now willing to
openly express anti-semitic beliefs, coupled with the
slow economic recovery from the devastation of the Great
Depression,

finding positions in American universities

became more difficult for immigrant Jewish professors
(Fermi, 1987; Nachmansohn, 1979; Weinberg, 1986).
The only offer Meyerhof received was for a
directorship of a small laboratory within a commercial
enterprise at an annual salary of $5,000
1979).

(Nachmansohn,

With this unsatisfactory option on the horizon,

Meyerhof became quite disheartened,

David Nachmansohn, a

former colleague at the Kaiser Wilhelm Institute and a
very close friend, suggested that he take a position in
France.

Nachmansohn knew that the French had a great

admiration and appreciation for Meyerhof and his
scientific research and that they would be quite willing
to accept him (1979).
Meyerhof was very productive during his tenure at
Institut de Biologie Physico-Chimique
Schlessinger, 1986).

(Schlessinger and

In all likelihood, Meyerhof would

have chosen to remain in Paris except for the outbreak of
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hostilities between Germany and France and the
declaration of war that occurred just one year after his
arrival.

By May, 1940, Meyerhof determined that he would

have to return to America

(Nachmansohn, 1979).

His efforts to leave Paris, however, did not go
smoothly.

He and his family had to make a difficult and

dangerous journey through France and Spain.
spread of the war throughout Europe,
increasingly difficult.

With the

escape grew

Once again, with the German

Army's impending occupation of Paris, Meyerhof found
himself, as he had previously in Germany, in a place
where the opportunity for him to teach and to research
within an atmosphere of free inquiry was being eliminated
by a narrow-minded political ideology (Duggan and Drury,
1948; Kevles, 1978; Nachmansohn, 1979).
Meyerhof called upon his friend David Nachmansohn
who, in the meantime, had accepted an invitation to join
the faculty of Yale University.

Nachmansohn contacted A.

V. Hill, who was Meyerhof's long-time scientific
colleague and personal friend, who in turn contacted A.
N. Richards, a professor at the University of
Pennsylvania and the President of the National Academy of
Sciences.

Together they solicited the Emergency Relief

Committee (ERC) to assist in Meyerhof's escape
and Drury,

1948; Nachmansohn,

1979; Weinberg,

(Duggan
1986)
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The ERC, headed by Dr. Stephen P. Duggan, the
founder and director of the Institute of International
Education, had been developed through collaborative
efforts with Dr. Alfred E. Cohn of the Rockefeller
Institute of Medical Research.

The Committee, which had

functioned for twelve years in the United States
providing assistance to foreign emigres, made funds
available through grants-in-aid for salaries and research
to colleges, universities and learned institutions.
Between 1933 and 1939, the Committee, with the aid of
Rockefeller Foundation matching grants, distributed about
$1,000,000 in professorial stipends {Duggan and Drury,
1948; Weinberg,
anti-semitism,

1986).

Additionally, to counter-act

the ERC advocated an increasingly powerful

moral argument as to the need to rescue these immigrant
intellectuals.

It raised funds by sponsoring concerts

and charity affairs

{Kevles, 1978) .

With the help of the Emergency Relief Committee,
Meyerhof finally escaped to Spain and from there reached
the United States in October, 1940.

He was further

assisted by the ERC when it partially funded a
professorship created by Dr. Richards for Meyerhof at the
University of Pennsylvania in the Department of
Physiological Chemistry.

The joint efforts of friends,

colleagues, national organizations,

and philanthropists
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proved to be adequate to the task of securing for
Meyerhof the opportunity to pursue the truth, unhindered
by the dreadful political forces spreading across Western
Europe and the equally foreboding forces of anti-semitism
that were now socially and politically overt in America
(Duggan and Drury, 1948; Nachmansohn,

1979).

Upon arrival in Philadelphia, he once again built
his laboratory.

He began to share his methods and to

enlighten his colleagues with his concepts.

He inspired

great admiration and affection among those within his
department and they were much influenced by his ideas.
Meyerhof was finally able once again to attain the level
of research that had won him the Nobel Prize
(Nachmansohn, 1979).

Otto Stern in America
In 1933,

the American Association of University

Professors issued a public resolution that was
transmitted to the Committee on Intellectual Cooperation
of the League of Nations. It statied that the AAUP
has no wish to express any opinion on the political
life or ideals of any nation, but science and
scholarship long since have become international,
and the conditions of intellectual life in every
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important country are a matter of legitimate concern
to every other (Fleming and Bailyn, 1969, 208).
The statement was intended as an expression of conviction
and sympathy for "members of the profession who had been
subjected to intolerant treatment in these difficult
times"

(1969, 208).

This aspect of intellectual internationalism, that
circumstances that impact one intellectual impact all
intellectuals, was a conviction held by Otto Stern.

The

idea of an international intellectual brotherhood of
scientists continued to be part of his personal
philosophy even after leaving Germany.

Stern was

convinced that all scholars had the right to pursue truth
within their fields of study.

To him, the protection of

this right was essential, not only for the academic
freedom of the individual scholar, but also as a means of
furthering the intellectual freedom of the international
academic community as a whole

(Heathcote, 1953; Zuckerman

1977; Davie, 1947).
Stern came to America in 1933 to accept a physics
professorship at the Carnegie Institute of Technology in
Pennsylvania.

He had left Germany not merely because of

the likelihood of his own persecution but also because
the Nazi regime had begun to adversely affect the lives
of his colleagues within the physics laboratory he
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directed.

He further demonstrated his willingness to aid

fellow scientists when he helped to arrange the escape
from Germany of otto Frisch, a physicist at the
University of Hamburg.

Stern, through his association

with the Academic Assistance Council, which was
established in May, 1933, was also able to help Frisch
secure a position as a physicist at P. M. S. Blackett's
laboratory at Birkbeck College in London (Davie, 1947;
Fleming and Bailyn, 1969).
Stern's involvement with the Academic Assistance
Council

(AAC) was b o m out of his commitment to the ideal

of an international intellectual brotherhood.

The AAC,

which had been established by Sir William Beveridge, an
English economist, and Lord Ernest Rutherford, a dominant
figure in English science, had been chartered "to defend
the principle of academic freedom and to help those
scholars and scientists of any nationality who, on
grounds of religion or political opinion, were prevented
from continuing their work in their own country"
and Bailyn, 1969, 211).

(Fleming

The financial support for the

Council came from English scholars who choose to
contribute a percentage of their salary in order to
create and support positions for exiled German
intellectuals.

For Stern, the AAC served as a platform

from which he could assist exiled immigrants to secure
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academic positions.

In Frisch's case, after service at

the Blackett's laboratory, he was asked to accept a chair
at the Bohr Institute for Theoretical Physics in
Copenhagen, Denmark.

To Otto Stern, the essence of his

efforts in this area was, not only helping fellow
scholars relocate, but ensuring that the academic
environments to which they gravitated allowed them the
opportunity to exercise the intellectual freedom that
Stern believed was vital to useful academic activity
(1969; Weber,

1980).

Stern's continued concern for his German colleagues
as well as his work with organizations that assisted
exiled intellectuals was further demonstrated by his
identification with two groups that protested the Nazi
denigration of science

(Davie, 1947; Fleming and Bailyn,

1969; Zuckerman, 1977).
In 1934, a group of distinguished European scholars
in America issued a statement calling for scientists to
condemn the limiting boundaries that political forces in
Germany had placed around German science:
In that country the exact sciences have been openly
degraded to jobbing for war industries.

During the

education of young physicists and chemists, much
time is devoted to lectures and practical exercises
in "defensive science":

gas protection, air
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protection, study of explosives, war intelligence
service, which have no relation to the scientific
significance

(of their field].

Moreover, only

such investigations are favored which are likely to
bring about a direct technical advance (Fleming and
Bailyn,

1969, 209).

These constraints, which were being imposed by Nazi
policy, were placing limitations upon the professors'
freedom to pursue their own research.

Whereas science

had been previously viewed as a means of enlightening the
concepts of mankind and encouraging the pursuit of future
knowledge,

it was now being called upon to support the

political agenda of the state.

By forcing the

replacement of scholarly intellectualism with the
"science of armaments", a professor's research was no
longer his own; instead, it had to be carried out within
state-defined parameters.

Out of a desire to stop such

limitations upon professorial rights, Stern decided to
embrace the tenets of this declaration.
In 1938, Stern joined another effort to challenge
Nazi limitations upon the academic freedom of German
professors.

He supported the 1,284 signatories of a

manifesto that challenged an article written by the Nazi
Nobel Laureate, Johannes Stark.

In his article, Stark

denounced "theoretical physics, stressing the importance
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that, in German universities, applied research be pursued
for technology,

industry, economic self-sufficiency, and

war production"

(Wistrich, 1982, 297).

The manifesto

labeled Stark's article as
an attack on all theoretical physics, and by obvious
implication, on scientific theory in general.

It

introduces the official racism of the Nazi's to
divide physicists into good, that is, nontheoretical and Aryan, and bad, that is, theoretical
and Jewish (Fleming and Bailyn, 1969, 209-210).
Stern's agreement with the manifesto's position was
largely predicated upon his belief that "any attack upon
freedom of thought in one sphere, even as non-political a
sphere as theoretical physics, is in effect an attack
upon democracy itself"

(1969, 210) .

To allow a

degradation of scholarly pursuit such as that being
perpetrated by Stark and his colleagues in the Nazi
Party, served only as a means to enslave the intellectual
freedom of a people and therefore to disallow the
unhindered pursuit of truth.
By the late 1930s, Stern was firmly established in
the American academic community; he had held a position
at the Carnegie Institute of Technology in Pennsylvania
since 1933.

He served there as a professor until 1945,

when he retired as a professor emeritus.

Two years
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before he retired, Stern won the Nobel Prize in Physics,
largely due to the productive research which he was able
to pursue at the Carnegie Institute.

The fruitfulness of

his research is appraised by fellow Nobelist, Max Born:
Stern became a great physicist, as I had predicted.
The method of molecular radiation which he
introduced into atomic physics has become one of the
main instruments of present-day research; his
teaching has spread all over the world, and has
produced numerous discoveries of the first rank as
well as a significant number of Nobel Prize winners
(Zuckerman, 1977, 25).
The lack of material available on Stern did not
permit me to evaluate whether or not the limitations upon
academic freedom in America, which were experienced by
the other scientists in my study, were limitations that
Stern also encountered.

However,

the direction and

calibre of work that Otto Stern was able to produce in
the United States would not have been possible under the
requirements and constraints imposed upon scholars and
scientists in Nazi Germany.
America,

Stern apparently found, in

the intellectual liberty that permitted free and

unhindered research (Fleming and Bailyn, 1969).

He

believed that every scholar had the right to work in an
environment that would allow for the fullest expression
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of his talents without concern as to political agendas or
geographical boundaries.

Summary
The events that impacted the careers of Albert
Einstein, James Franck, Otto Meyerhof, and Otto Stern
were focused on an academic realm that was nestled within
an arena of political turmoil.

Academic freedom was the

singular element upon which the fruitfulness of their
careers balanced.

It was the setting askew of this

balance that caused these elite scientists to re-examine
their lives, their careers, and their professions and to
take steps to once again see that balance restored.
They each had made the decision to leave their
homeland because those things that had been held dear
were being trampled by Nazi boots.

Likewise, they hoped

to rediscover those same precious elements in a foreign
land.

The journey was for each of these professors the

same crucial, yet brave quest that is occasionally
necessary for men who desire to continue to "breathe
free."
On one hand, there was the German state--controlled
by the Nazi agenda for a pure Aryan race using a pure
Aryan science that stilled the heart of true research and
true teaching.

To surrender to such an agenda would have
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been to acquiesce to the sheer impossibility of academic
freedom existing while bound by the chains of academic
slavery.
On the other hand, there was the United States-where there existed a conflict between the prerogatives
of the academic and the fears of the populace.

As a

mortal import, the emigrant arrived on the same barge as
did economic chaos, communism, and xenophobia.

These

elements were as real a threat to academic freedom as was
the propaganda of the Nazi regime.
In America, the door had been opened upon a field
where the battle for equality remained to be fought.

The

arena was different; yet, the foe was essentially the
same--the belief that the demands of the many should take
precedence over the rights of the few.

These four

immigrant scholars faced this new challenge and took up
the gauntlet of academic freedom.

CHAPTER 7
CONCLUSION

Introduction
The nature and development of academic freedom has
been formed and directed by the constructs of and the
constraints upon intellectual liberty.

When academic

freedom's structural and theoretical tenets, which are a
product of time and place, are challenged by those
elements that seek to manipulate truth, forces come into
play.

The forces of universally-applicable and

educationally-specific constructs and constraints

(see

Figure 1) constitute the politically-driven conventions
that define academic freedom.

The ensuing dynamic

interaction between ideological lines either nullifies or
solidifies the intellectual liberty of scholars.

The

examination and evaluation of such interactions has led
me to conclude that the politically-determined
conventions of academic freedom have both positively and
negatively influenced the careers of four particular
scientists.
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CONSTRUCTS
UNIVERSALLY-APPLICABLE

EDUCATIONALLY-SPECIFIC

Principles of Acceptable
Knowledge

>>>

Lehrfreiheit

Access to Acceptable
Knowledge

>»

Lernfreiheit

Principle of Authority

>>>

Academic Self-Governance

The Right of
Ideological
Dissemination

>>>

Extra- and IntraMural Utterance

Innate Heterogeneity
of the Human Experience

>>>

Individualism

CONSTRAINTS
UNIVERSALLY-APPLICABLE

EDUCATIONALLY-SPECIFIC

Institutionalization
of Current Societal
Norms

>»

Governmental,
Bureaucratic, and
Legislative Power

Ideology of Resource
Distribution

>»

Financial Constraints

Social Definitions of
Acceptability

>>>

Scapegoating

Agenda Advancement
Through Ideological
Consolidation

»>

Nationalism

Figure 1. Universal constructs and constraints upon the
endeavors of mankind and their devolved conceptual
representation in the educational arena.
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The heart of academic freedom, as indicated by
Searle

(1975), is the right, without interference,

to

teach, to conduct research, and to publish the findings
of that research.
perspectives:

This principle operates from two

the first represents a special,

institutionally-specific basis and the second is a
general, universal foundation.

My study indicates that

the "special" basis for the implementation of academic
freedom is that which is found within the university and
is exemplified by the interaction between the
professoriate and other internal entities.

The "general"

basis is an understanding that, as free individuals,
professors should be able to share their professional
viewpoints, uninhibited by forces outside the university.
I conclude that both the internal and external elements
of Searle's principle must function simultaneously in
order for intellectual liberty to be maintained.
The combination of these elements of academic
freedom is affected by what Fuchs

(1963) emphasizes as

the development of intellectual liberty through both
evolutionary and environmental processes.

These two

components work hand-in-hand within the university and
society in establishing academic freedom.

The changes

that occur in the historical development of intellectual
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liberty within the German and American professoriate and
within the careers of four elite immigrant scientists
reflect the interplay between evolutionary constructs and
environmental constraints.

Germany
When Humboldt, in 1810, attempted to lessen the
state's control over the University of Berlin by
establishing a model of academic freedom, he did so based
upon three constructs:

Lehrfreiheit. the freedom of

teaching and research; Lernfreiheit. the freedom of
learning; and academic self-government
Maurois,

1966).

(Rodes, 1964;

While Humboldt was stressing the need to

separate the monarchy and the university so that higher
education might prosper,

the bureaucracy was working to

increase state control by use of the constraints of
selecting appointees and of requiring that the university
and its professors support the state's agenda (Gay, 1968;
Beyerchen,

1977).

As nationalism invaded the political conscience of
the German nation during the mid-1800s, an increasing
desire for academic freedom moved some members of the
professoriate to exercise their right to greater
intellectual liberty.

Professor Ernst Arndt supported

students' rights to protest even though the protests had
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been labeled "revolutionary" by the state.

Arndt's

subsequent arrest by state officials was protested by his
fellow professors as an arbitrary limitation to
Humboldt's construct of Lehrfreiheit.

The Prussian

government's use of power to prevent both students and
professors from expressing their intellectual liberty by
challenging state authority was a constraint in
opposition to the construct of individualism, paramount
in the nationalistic philosophy (Kandel, 1935; Lilge,
1975).
With Professor Leo Arons, the Prussian government
wanted the University of Berlin to revoke his veni
legendi because Arons' political views did not align with
those of the government; however,
refused to sanction Arons.

the faculty senate

In response, the government

passed legislation in 1899 prohibiting professors with
unacceptable political beliefs from teaching at royal
universities.

The construct of academic self-governance

as exercised by the faculty senate was flagrantly
constrained by the legislative power of the government
embodied in the passage of "lex Arons"
Thomas, 1971; Craig,

(Samuel and

1978).

The Weimar Republic, established in 1919, was unable
to eliminate the nationalism that was becoming more and
more characteristic of the "German" mind.

As a means of
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constraint,

the government had historically used its

financial resources to keep the allegiance of the
professoriate.

With the World War I reparations

stipulated by the Treaty of Versailles, the Weimar
Republic did not have the fiscal assets to maintain the
professoriate's pre-World War I funding level.

The

impact of this deficit upon the faculty was manifested in
a lowering of their prestige within society and a
struggle for professorial security.

The professors

feared that reduced finances would create a reduced
number of faculty positions.

This led the faculty to

look for a scapegoat responsible for their lowered
prestige and lack of security {Hasluck, 1938; Kelly,
1972).
Some of the professors believed that their Jewish
colleagues generally held internationalistic philosophies
because many Jews had positions in the internationallyfocused Weimar Republic.

This belief,

coupled with

current professorial woes, provided the fuel necessary
for anti-semitic sentiments to flourish (Kelly, 1972).
Many of the professors ascribed their financial distress
to the Jewish members of the Weimar bureaucracy.

They

did not want to accept that their support for Germany's
pre-World War I nationalism had (1) led to a war that was
concluded b y a treaty that financially crippled the
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nation;

(2) brought about the establishment of the Weimar

Republic; and (3) led to the professors' reduced
circumstances.

As Allport

(1983) indicates, when fear

and anxiety over real or imagined danger threatens an
individual's security, people will often seek out an
individual or group to blame.
case,

In most cases, as in this

"scapegoating" is either partly or wholly

unfounded.
When the Jewish professor, Hans Nawiasky, of the
University of Munich, spoke out in favor of the legal
validity of the Treaty of Versailles, his professorial
liberty was restricted.

When his position was challenged

by angry students, his colleagues did not uphold
Nawiasky's right to comment on controversial political
issues.

Many members of the professoriate disapproved

of the Treaty and of those Jews they felt were
sympathetic with it.

Their disapproval was based on the

belief that the Treaty's stipulations were the root
causes of their financial distress.

The faculty had

chosen to limit one of its own member's access to the
construct of Lehrfreiheit

(Gay, 1968; Grunberger,

1971)-

A scapegoat had been found in the person of Hans Nawiasky
and the faculty's anger over the present political
environment led them to use the constraint of sanctioning
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as a means of curtailing a colleague's classroom
expression (Allport, 1958; Ringer, 1969).
Humboldt's principles of academic freedom were
violated when, prior to World War II, some of the German
professoriate began to view Jewish scapegoating as
acceptable within the philosophy of the National
Socialist Party.

As Beyerchen (1977)

indicates, many of

these National Socialist professors began to believe that
the state and the faculty should work together in a
spirit of nationalism.

This nationalistic philosophy

contended that the Jew represented a despised intrusion
into the Teutonic background and the historical
foundations of German culture.

National socialism

practiced discrimination by exclusion.

As scapegoats,

Jewish professors were isolated as a repugnant threat to
the nationalistic goals of the university and the Party
and, by extension, the government.

The attack was not

merely upon the person of the Jewish professor.
Allport

As

(1958) conceptualized, the attack took the form

of labeling a discredited group to which all connections
must be severed.

Thus, the elimination of non-Aryan

thought throughout German society was manifested through
Jewish professors being fired, their books being burned,
and their teachings being labeled as "un-German."

This

three-fold approach used by the Nazis was an effective
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constraint in that it delimited academic freedom in
Germany.

Humboldt's constructs of Lehrfreiheit.

Lernfreiheit. and academic self-governance deteriorated
when both the faculty and the state used discrimination
and scapegoating as constraints

(Kneller, 1941; Bentwich,

1953).
A systematic program of increasing state control
concluded with the Nazis determining who taught, who
administrated, who learned, and what was taught.

The

interaction between the evolutionary constructs and the
environmental constraints of German academic freedom
resulted in the phenomena of scapegoating, where the
weaker social group is abused verbally or physically by
the stronger body politic

(Allport, 19 83).

The

interaction equally devastated Humboldt's idea of
academic freedom and destroyed the intellectual liberty
of the German professoriate.

America
The development of academic freedom in America
during the 1700s was marked by the development of several
forces, such as the combined constraints of the power and
influence of the American aristocracy.

This group,

comprised of members of the ecclesiastical, political,
and collegiate arenas, used their financial power at
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times to constrain professorial intellectual libertyOften, these benefactors used their financial influence
to muzzle faculty members who held viewpoints that
conflicted with theirs.

Academic freedom was limited as

college presidents and governing boards were willing to
acquiesce to the demands of those who held the purse
strings
Portman,

(Hofstadter and Metzger,

1955; French,

1964;

1972).

With the move into the 1800s, classically-based
curriculum was being augmented by newly-established
professional schools, such as law and medicine.

This

utilitarian emphasis required a professor whose expertise
was based upon his specialized knowledge in the
professional disciplines.

Utilitarian education also

required increased funding from state sources because it
involved both curriculum expansion and increased faculty.
With the dependence upon the government for more
financial resources, governing boards attempted to
curtail professorial freedoms so that there would be no
conflict between the agenda of the university and that of
their financial benefactor, the states.

These attempts

took the form of limits upon the construct of faculty
authority over the development of the curriculum.
restraint to the university's deliberate act of
undermining professorial rights was professorial

The
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expertise.

Because of the uniqueness of the faculty's

specialized knowledge, they were in a position to cause
governing boards and states to capitulate to their
demands to retain control over the curriculum (French,
1964; Herbst,

1965).

With the onset of the Civil War, slavery became the
issue upon which professorial freedom to pursue and teach
the truth was questioned.

The politically-motivated

construct of ideological bias, based upon how the North
and the South saw the necessity of slavery, became an
issue of debate within the university setting.
Professorial opinions, whether for or against the black
man's freedom, could be interpreted as a direct attack
against the "national-view" of either the North or the
South.

To hold controversial views, particularly ones as

volatile as those incumbent to the slavery issue,
result in a professor's dismissal.

could

States and their

universities were willing to use their administrative
authority as a constraint to ensure a professor's
allegiance

(Hofstadter and Metzger,

American students,

1955; Veysey,

1965).

throughout the latter part of the

1800s, began to travel to Germany in search of a higher
level of scholarship than that which was available to
them in American colleges.

While there,

they observed

the intellectual liberty enjoyed by German professors and
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students.

This liberty was the result of the application

of the constructs of Lernfreiheit. Lehrfreiheit. and
academic self-governance.

Inspired by their experience,

they desired to transplant these constructs of the German
model of academic freedom into American colleges and
universities.

At the turn of the century, the paramount

concern of many of the returning scholars was to improve
scholarship and instruction in the United States.

This

coincided with the struggle of some professors to
implement and define, within the system of higher
education in the United States, not only the constructs
of Humboldt's model of academic freedom, but also the
uniquely American concept of the constructs of intra- and
extra-mural utterance

(Thwing, 1928; Rudolph, 1962).

In 1900, Professor Edward A. Ross of Stanford spoke
out publicly against some of the business practices that
had proved successful for Mr. Leland Stanford, the
founder of Stanford University.

At that time, the

financial resources upon which the university rested had
been placed, not with a board of trustees, but solely in
the hands of Mr. Stanford's widow.

Highly offended by

Professor Ross' comments, she demanded and eventually
secured his dismissal.

Through the economic clout of

Stanford's "one-woman" governing board, constraints had
been placed upon the construct of extra-mural utterance.
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Professor Ross' dismissal,

coupled with the growing

desire for the guarantee of extra-mural utterance, led
some members of America's professoriate to establish an
organization where their demands for academic freedom
could be addressed (Hofstadter and Metzger, 1955;
Brubacher and Rudy, 1958).
The American Association of University professors
(AAUP) was formed in part to ensure the proper exercise
of the constraint of lay-board authority over the
university.

Judge Ogden L. Mills, a distinguished jurist

and Harvard graduate, indicated that professorial views
might not always coincide with those of governing boards,
but that a greater disservice would be done to society if
the voice of the professoriate to search for and speak
the truth were restricted (Alberty and Bode, 1938).

The

1915 Declaration of Principles of the AAUP laid a
foundation that served to strengthen this concept.

By

asserting that constraints against the freedom of
professors to pursue, to teach, and to share truth should
be discarded, students would be able to critically assess
new ideas and determine their validity (Declaration,
1915).

The construct of faculty intra- and extra-mural

utterance embodied in the AAUP proclamation was
challenged when America became involved in World War I.
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At the height of America's participation in the war,
a debate arose as to whether or not national security was
threatened by a professor's right to academic freedom.
The state governments desired to use legislative
authority as a constraint against such liberty.
Professors believed that national security could only be
maintained through a free exercise of the constructs of
intra- and extra-mural utterance

(Bentwich, 1953) .

The

AAUP responded to such legislative restraints with a
statement that allowed the limitation of professorial
rights, within a wartime setting, as long as those
restrictions were commensurate with those enjoined upon
all citizens

(Report, 1918).

Constraints against academic freedom surfaced during
the 1930s as a result of the "Red Scare," an hysterical
fear of many Americans that European communism would
replace American capitalism and that the ideals of the
American dream were being supplanted by foreign-born
immigrants

(Fermi, 1987; Kleves, 1987).

The "Scare" was

countered by state legislatures that instituted teacher
loyalty oaths.

Under this legislation, professors,

because they were viewed as having considerable influence
over the minds of America's youth, were required to
declare their allegiance to state and national
constitutions and to acknowledge their support of
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American nationalism.

This action was seen by many

faculties and universities as a constraint to a
professor's fundamental right to express and evaluate the
controversial issues of society.

The AAUP and the

American Association of Colleges,

in their combined

strength began,

in 1934, to work on their "Statement of

Principles and Interpretative Comments on Academic
Freedom and Tenure" in opposition to such legislation.
As a result of their continued efforts, the constraint of
teacher oath laws gradually faded (Alberty and Bode,
1938; Knight and Hall, 1951).
During the 1930s, the Great Depression brought about
a plummeting of governmental financial support for higher
education; with fewer resources, faculty job security
lessened.

When both state and federal legislatures

slashed fiscal appropriations, universities had to cut
back programs and limit faculty hiring.

This financial

reality acted as a constraint upon the construct of
faculty self-governance in the hiring process.

Whereas

professors would normally be hired based upon their
qualifications,
of other factors

fiscal concerns led to the consideration
(Kevles, 1978; Perry,

1984).

An additional consideration that occasionally kept
professorial expertise from being relied upon as one of
the paramount qualifications for hiring was the
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constraint of authority used by hiring committees upon
the construct of academic self-governance.

Many faculty

recruitment processes in colleges and universities across
the country yielded to citizen pressure to give
preference to "native-born" applicants rather than to
immigrants, particularly Jews
Clark, 1984).

(Fleming and Bailyn,

1969;

When some universities hired new faculty,

they relied upon the constraint of "tabloid thinking."
This form of scapegoating occurs when an individual or
group simplifies an issue in order to facilitate finding
an acceptable solution to a social dilemma
1983).

(Allport,

During this time of fiscal scarcity, some hiring

committees, in adopting this form of scapegoating,
simplified their social dilemma of having to find
positions for "native-born" American applicants by
ignoring the applications of many highly qualified Jewish
immigrants who were seeking faculty positions

(1983;

Fermi, 1987).
Intellectual liberty in America was largely
established and maintained by the AAUP through its
issuance of resolutions that formed a codified foundation
for academic freedom, upholding the constructs of
Lehrfreiheit. academic self-governance, and intra- and
extra-mural utterance.

This was done in the face of

constraints such as governmental power being used to
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restrict professorial rights during wartime, limitations
to free speech being applied in the form of teacher oath
laws, and scapegoating.

The dynamic interplay between

these prevailing forces served as a catalyst for the
development of academic freedom in America.

The Four Intellectuals
In this case study, I have examined the lives of
four exiled intellectuals.

Their experiences with

academic freedom hinged upon several elements.
element was their Jewish heritage.

One such

With the passage of

the Civil Service Laws in Germany during the 1930s, the
Jew was relegated to an inferior position relative to
that of individuals of pure Aryan heritage

(Tal, 1982).

In like manner, anti-semitism was evident in America when
popular polls indicated that a majority of Americans
considered Jews to be "greedy, dishonest, and overly
aggressive"

(Weinberg, 1986, 220).

The question being

asked is "Why is prejudice aimed at the Jew?"

The answer

to this question established the constraints upon the
academic freedom of four particular elite scientists.
As Allport .(1958) indicates,

groups rather than

individuals are often chosen as objects of hate and
aggression.

The reason for this choice is that one human

being is, after all, fairly similar to another.

To
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attack an individual would be to arouse some pain within
ourselves.

Groups, however, are more abstract and

impersonal, particularly if either a visible or corporate
distinguishing characteristic is identifiable for such a
group.

Group characteristics may include skin color or a

particular cultural heritage.
Additionally, people hold prejudices against groups
because they find it unnecessary to test unfavorable
stereotypes against reality.

A stereotypical expression,

such as all Jews have big noses, does not require proof
for the prejudiced group to believe the statement
1947).

In group scapegoating,

(1947, 214) hatred surfaces.

(Fromm,

"character-conditioned"
This hatred arises from a

continued readiness to hate based upon a perceived,
whether real or not, danger from the hated group

(1947).

In my study, the elements of this hatred have acted as
constraints upon Jews and particularly upon the academic
freedom of Jewish professors.
Jews were hated by the Aryans in Germany.

Aryans

feared that Jewish internationalist views threatened the
nationalistic demand for support of all things German.
Jews were hated by "white, Anglo-saxon Protestants"
(WASPS)

in America for their international views because

of the fear that those views were closely aligned with
communism.

The four scientists in my case study saw
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themselves presenting scientific knowledge as a means of
bettering the lives of every citizen in the world.
knowledge,

Their

their expertise, their inquiry, and their

findings were dedicated to universal good, not for
partisan or nationalistic honor

(Hasluck, 1938; Fromm,

1947; Fermi, 1968).
In Germany, as Einstein's intellectual liberty was
challenged due to the constraint of nationalism,

the Nazi

party chose to use their power to dismiss him as a
constraint against his internationalist philosophy.
Likewise, upon receipt of the news of his intended move
to America,

individuals such as Mrs. Randolph

Frothingham,

President of the Woman Patriotic

Corporation, used protest as a constraint against the
dissemination,

in America, of Einstein's

internationalist, and perceived communist beliefs.

In

Germany, Einstein resisted the constraints by resigning
his position before he could be dismissed.

In America,

his professional power and personal influence, due to the
country's need for his intellectual advancements,
superseded the Woman Patriotic Corporation's political
influence.

In some cases, such as Einstein's, despite

group scapegoating, personal characteristics outweigh
group characterizations, which allow for a tolerant
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response from the "scapegoaters"

(Allport, 1958; Clark,

1984) .
The Jew was also hated in Germany for his non-Aryan
heritage because of the fear that his "Jewishness" would
pollute the "pure Aryan" ideal.

Likewise, in the United

States, he was hated for his "non-American" heritage
because of an irrational fear of foreigners.

These fears

served to color the perspective held by some individuals
in Germany and in America as to the theoretical approach
of some Jewish scientists.

The Nazis felt that this

theoretical approach was one that gave science a "Jewish"
perspective rather than a practical nationalistic or
Aryan one.

The Jewish view of scientific research did

not rest easy on the minds of certain Americans who felt
that the world was being fooled by a "foreigner's"
revision of the natural order of things
Fromm, 1947; Jackman and Borden,

(Kneller, 1941;

1983; Sayen, 1985).

Franck had determined to remain within Nazi Germany
as long as his Jewish colleagues were not restrained.
When the Nazis used their political power as a constraint
against the Jew, Franck resigned his position and left
Germany.

Under President Isaiah Bowman of Johns Hopkins

University, Franck once again found that, because of his
Jewish heritage, he was limited by the constraint of
administrative power.

In these situations, the
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constraint of either political or administrative power
was used as a means of discrimination because a
particular individual belonged to a scapegoated group
(Duggan and Drury,
Gallin,

1948; Kelly, 1972; Allport, 1983;

1986).

The Jew was hated by some of the citizenry of the
Weimar Republic.

They feared that the Jews' position

within the bureaucracy would ensure the employment of
Jews rather than "pure Germans" in the limited
governmental positions available within a depressed
economy.

The Jew was hated by Americans for his mere

presence because of their fear that his gaining
employment would fill the limited number of positions
that "native-born" Americans were seeking in Depression
America.

The Jews' affiliation with the Weimar Republic

and their labeling as "foreigners" positioned them as
scapegoats for the anxieties inherent in financially
depressed economies

(Fromm, 1947; Perry, 1984; Gallin,

1986).
In Germany, the alignment of the four scientists in
my study with the Weimar Republic's support for the
Treaty of Versailles resulted in their being seen by some
of their colleagues as partly responsible for the
financial distress caused by the Treaty.

In America,

their selection for professorial positions that could
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have been filled by "native-born" Americans caused them
to be linked to the financial problems associated with
the limited number of employment possibilities for
Americans during the Depression.

Therefore,

these Jewish

professors' exercise of Lehrfreiheit. as a construct that
provided academic freedom, was limited by the constraint
of public opinion (Hasluck, 1938; Gallin, 1986).
In both Germany and America, the public's fear of
economic failure fueled anti-semitism.

As an individual,

Stern countered this constraint by assisting other
individual immigrant professors in finding faculty
positions where the construct of academic freedom was not
limited by anti-semitism.

In the case of each of the

scientists in my study, they were able,

through their

individual skills, knowledge, and abilities, to
circumvent the scapegoating against their "Jewish" group
and to garner support from certain collegiate spheres of
influence in order to find freedom rather than suffer
under discrimination in their academic pursuits.

These

four scientists faced the constraint of a xenophobic and
ethnocentric public through an ability to override social
discrimination in their attempts to find professorial
positions, whether at home or abroad, where the
constructs of academic freedom prevailed (Lilge, 1975;
Perry, 1984).
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The foundation for their campaign for academic
freedom can be seen in Wilhelm von Humboldt's writings of
over a century ago:
It is not that the State ought to teach respect for
the Jews.

What it ought to do is to eradicate the

inhumane and prejudiced mentality that judges a
human being not by his specific qualities but by his
descent and religion, and treats him not as an
individual but as a member of a group with which he
is considered to share certain characteristics of
necessity.

This the State can only do by saying

loud and clear that it no longer recognizes any
differences.. . (Weinberg, 1986, 89).

Recommendat ions
The major recommendations that can be drawn from my
case study revolve around three distinct concepts; those
of the universities,

the faculties, and academic freedom.

The interplay between these three entities created the
stage upon which the intellectual liberty of scholars
rests.

Examining the relationship among these three

yields the following recommendations.
Although much research is available with reference
to the historical evolution of academic freedom and the
history of both the German and American universities,
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scholars have neglected the impact of the politicallydetermined conventions of academic freedom on the careers
of particular faculty members.

The relationship between

the political state and the university is evident.
However, the converse effect between the politicallydetermined evolution of the university and of its impact
upon faculty members has not been explored in depth.
Even in the research on Einstein, Franck, Meyerhof, and
Stern, where one would anticipate an interest based upon
the consequences of such conventions,

the main aspect--

the Jewish question--was the only political emphasis on
which substantial information was available.
My research on the careers of these men was hampered
by a lack of primary sources on Franck, Meyerhof, and
Stern and secondary sources on Stern.

Particularly

lacking were biographies on and autobiographies by
Franck, Meyerhof, and Stern.
of Stern,

Additionally, in the case

connections were not made within the available

literature indicating his involvement in many of the
situations with which his colleagues had to deal.
Research focusing into Stern's tenure at the Carnegie
Institute of Technology might reveal more about
conditions he experienced relative to academic freedom.
Additional research should tackle the effect of
"private governments"

(McWilliams,

1948) or various
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governing bodies, upon the academic freedom of the Jewish
professoriate.

Just as Henry Ford affected the thoughts

of citizens through his anti-semitism, so others, whose
power and influence remain outside the university walls,
can influence its internal and external academic liberty.
Although Hofstadter and Metzger

(1955) have researched

the impact of big-business philanthropy upon higher
education, it would be of particular value to look more
closely at the impact that such private philanthropies
have had upon the constraint of anti-semitism.
As in the case of Isaiah Bowman, university
presidents can and do affect academic careers.

Studying

the degree and manner of influence by which university
presidents may have altered the careers of faculty would
provide insight into how the constructs of academic
freedom serve as restraints to administrative authority.
Contemporary aspects of academic freedom are seen in
the case of the Afrocentrist Leonard Jeffries at CUNY,
the bills to abolish tenure before the South Carolina
legislature, and faculty members taking institutions to
court over tenure issues at Regent University in
Virginia.

Further study is recommended in order to

examine the effects of current time-frames and social
concerns upon intellectual liberty.

186
Academic freedom is a product of time and place.

It

is also a result of particular constructs and
constraints.

Politically-driven conventions remain one

of the catalysts that affect the intellectual liberty
experienced by scholars and students as they continue to
seek for truth within a climate of change.
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